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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
The Effects of the 2007-2009 Economic Crisis in the Global Automotive Industry 
The automotive industry had been severely affected by the tightening of credit caused by 
a subprime-lending crisis in the United States starting in the mid 2000’s. Demand for 
automobiles had fallen sharply all over the globe, and sales plummeted to a three-decade 
low in 2011. This caused serious repercussions, and the damage spread all over the world. 
It was only with government assistance that   the automotive industry quickly recovered 
after the recession.  
 This paper, will study the relationship between the global financial crisis and the 
automotive industry. It will focus on US car manufacturers as they were affected the 
most. It will also analyze other major markets around the world, notably Europe and 
Asia. This paper will reveal how auto manufacturers combatted the crisis, how 
governments managed to rescue and protect auto industries, and how autoworkers had to 
compromise. An analysis of their methods will be conducted. It has become clear that 
government help was essential yet not beneficial to the companies in question in the long 
run. Technology for environmental-friendly vehicles and quality improvement should be 
the long-term focus of car manufacturers compared to short-term profits.  
 
 
 
 
 
Xue Bai 
 
Date 
 iii 
State University of New York 
College at Buffalo 
Department of Economics and Finance 
The Effects of the 2007-2009 Economic Crisis on the Global automotive Industry 
A Thesis in  
Applied Economics 
by 
Xue Bai 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
December 2012 
 
Dates of Approval: 
__________________________                          _________________________________ 
                                                                              Xingwang Qian, Ph.D. 
                                                                              Assistant Professor of the Department of  
                                                                              Economics and Finance 
                                                                              Chairperson of the Committee/Thesis  
                                                                              Advisor 
 
 
__________________________                          _________________________________ 
                                                                              Theodore F. Byrley, Ph.D. 
                                                                              Chair and Associate Professor of the  
                                                                              Department of Economics and Finance 
 
 
__________________________                          _________________________________ 
                                                                              Kevin J. Railey, Ph.D. 
                                                                              Associate Provost and Dean of the  
                                                                              Graduate School 
 
 
 iv 
THESIS COMMITTEE SIGNATORY 
 
 
Dates of Approval 
__________________________                          _________________________________ 
                                                                              Xingwang Qian, Ph.D. 
                                                                              Assistant Professor of the Department of  
                                                                              Economics and Finance 
                                                                              Thesis Advisor 
 
 
__________________________                          _________________________________ 
                                                                              Theodore F. Byrley, Ph.D. 
                                                                              Associate Professor of the Department  
                                                                              of Economics and Finance 
 
 
__________________________                          _________________________________ 
                                                                              Ted P. Schmidt, Ph.D. 
                                                                              Associate Professor of the Department  
                                                                              of Economics and Finance 
 
 v
Dedication 
To my parents who have provided endless love and support wherever I was and whenever 
I needed.  
To my most beloved husband who has been a great source of motivation and inspiration 
in my studies and my life.  
To my father-in-law and mother-in-law who offered the best of their support and 
encouragement to me and to our family.  
To my precious daughter who brought me so much joy and happiness during my writing.  
 vi 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank the entire Economics and Finance Department for the excellent 
academic environment. My last four years of study in Buffalo State College were truly 
enjoyable and fulfilling.  
I would particularly like to convey my gratitude to Dr. Xingwang Qian for his continuous 
guidance and encouragement throughout the entire course of this thesis.  
I sincerely thank Dr. Theodore F. Byrley and Ted P. Schmidt for their willingness to assist 
me during the preparation of my thesis. 
I want to express my thanks to Dr. Victor Kasper Jr. for his constant dedication. His 
suggestions and explanations during the last four years of my study have been a major 
factor in completion of my work. 
I’m also thankful to Dr. Jean F. Gounard from the International Student Affairs Office, 
who offered never-ending help in all aspects of my student life here in Buffalo in the last 
four years. 
Finally, I would like to thank all other Professors whose classes I have attended. Without 
your dedicated support, encouragement, patience, effort, and help, I would not have 
achieved such a goal. You have become a paragon of academic excellence to me. 
 vii
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Literature Review ................................................................................................................ 4 
3. Financial Crisis and the Automotive Industry ........................................................... 9 
3.1 Effects of the financial crisis on the auto industry ........................................................... 9 
3.2 Cyclicality of the automotive industry ............................................................................... 11 
4. Crisis in North America ................................................................................................... 14 
4.1 Crisis in the United States ...................................................................................................... 14 
4.1.1 General analysis ................................................................................................................................. 14 
4.1.2 Industrial data .................................................................................................................................... 20 
4.1.3 Impact on the economy .................................................................................................................. 29 
4.1.4 Alternatives to bankruptcy ............................................................................................................ 33 
4.1.5 The review of the bailout processes .......................................................................................... 39 
4.1.6 Dealing with the fallout .................................................................................................................. 47 
4.1.7 Reform proposals .............................................................................................................................. 51 
4.2 Crisis in Canada ......................................................................................................................... 54 
5. Crisis in the European Markets ..................................................................................... 62 
5.1 Crisis in Russia ........................................................................................................................... 66 
5.1.1 Industry overview ............................................................................................................................. 68 
5.1.2 Key actors ............................................................................................................................................. 70 
5.1.3 Social impact of potential bankruptcy ...................................................................................... 71 
5.2 Crisis in Germany ...................................................................................................................... 72 
5.3 Crisis in France .......................................................................................................................... 75 
5.4 Crisis in Italy ............................................................................................................................... 77 
5.5 Crisis in Spain ............................................................................................................................. 77 
5.6 Crisis in the United Kingdom ................................................................................................ 78 
5.7 Measures to cope with the crisis ......................................................................................... 81 
5.7.1 Measures taken by the EU governments and institutions ................................................ 82 
5.7.2 Measures taken by automotive manufacturers .................................................................... 82 
6. Crisis in the Asian Markets ............................................................................................. 84 
 viii
6.1 Crisis in China ............................................................................................................................ 84 
6.2 Crisis in India ............................................................................................................................. 87 
6.3 Crisis in Japan............................................................................................................................. 88 
6.4 Crisis in South Korea ............................................................................................................... 92 
7.     Government Stimulus ................................................................................................... 97 
8.     The Future of the Automotive Industry............................................................... 102 
9.     Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 107 
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 111 
List of Abbreviations .......................................................................................................... 116 
APPENDIXES .......................................................................................................................... 118 
APPENDIX A ..................................................................................................................................... 118 
APPENDIX B ..................................................................................................................................... 122 
APPENDIX C ...................................................................................................................................... 123 
APPENDIX D ..................................................................................................................................... 124 
APPENDIX E ...................................................................................................................................... 126 
APPENDIX F ...................................................................................................................................... 127 
APPENDIX G...................................................................................................................................... 131 
APPENDIX H ..................................................................................................................................... 135 
 
 ix 
List of Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 3-1 Correlation between private consumption and car sales (Quarter-on-quarter 
growth rates 2000-2009).......................................................................................................... 12 
Table 3-1 Automobile production is more volatile than GDP and investment (Standard 
deviation of quarter-on quarter growth rates) .......................................................................... 12 
Figure 3-2 G7 GDP and automobile production growth (quarter-on-quarter growth rates).... 13 
Figure 4-1 U.S. auto sales........................................................................................................ 14 
Figure 4-2 Average Annual Sales for GM, Chrysler dealerships and their competitors (2005-
2008) ........................................................................................................................................ 18 
Figure 4-3 Hyundai USA monthly sales: 2008 - 2010 ............................................................ 19 
Figure 4-4 Hyundai U.S. sales growth vs. overall U.S. market growth .................................. 20 
Figure 4-5 Employment in Motor Vehicle and Parts Manufacturing and US Motor Vehicle 
Production, Seasonally Adjusted, 2007-2012 2007-2012 ....................................................... 22 
Figure 4-6 General Motors stock prices (10/15/07-5/29/08) ................................................... 30 
Figure 4-7 U.S. car sales growth ............................................................................................. 46 
Figure 4-8 Planned GM dealership reduction pre- and post-bankruptcy ................................ 50 
Figure 4-9 Canadian Auto Employment .................................................................................. 55 
Figure 4-10 Canadian Automobileautomotive Output ............................................................ 61 
Figure 5-1 Passenger car production in Europe 1990 – 2010.................................................. 63 
Figure 5-2 Commercial Vehicle Production in Europe 1990-2010 ......................................... 63 
Figure 5-3 New passenger car registration and GDP growth in the EU 1990 - 2009 ............. 64 
Figure 5-4 New commercial vehicle registration and GDP growth in the EU 1997 - 2009 .... 65 
Figure 5-5 New Light Vehicle Sales in Russian, Thousand of Units ...................................... 66 
Figure 5-6 German passengers car sales, monthly progress year-to-date (thousand units) ..... 73 
 x
Figure 5-7 French auto production compared to EU ............................................................... 75 
Figure 5-8 British Car Production is Accelerating .................................................................. 80 
Figure 5-9 UK Car Sales 2000-2011 ....................................................................................... 81 
Figure 6-1 China’s auto sale and prediction ......................................................................... 85 
Figure 6-2 China’s Car Growth Rate .................................................................................... 86 
Figure 6-3 India - Auto sales growth ....................................................................................... 88 
Figure 6-4 Drop in Japanese Motor Vehicle Sales .................................................................. 89 
Figure 6-5 Hyundai’s Car Sales ............................................................................................ 96 
Table 7-1 Principle measure to support the automobile sector ................................................ 99 
Figure 8-1 Hybrid production by country of brand origin 2006 and 2014 ............................ 106 
Table A  Sale and share of total market by manufacturer ...................................................... 118 
Table B  Top 20 vehicles, current month's sales .................................................................... 122 
Table C  Segment totals, ranked by Sep unit sales ................................................................ 123 
Table D  New passenger car registrations by market ............................................................ 124 
Figure D  New passenger car registrations in July ................................................................ 125 
Table E  Sales by top manufacturing group in China ............................................................ 126 
Table F China 2011 car sales up 5.2 pct ................................................................................ 127 
Table H-1  Automotive Industry and Economy ..................................................................... 135 
Table H-2  Employment ........................................................................................................ 137 
Table H-3  2011 Production Statistics ................................................................................... 138 
Figure H  Man-made CO2 Emission ..................................................................................... 140 
 
 1
1. Introduction 
The automotive industry comprises 3% of gross global product. In many Western 
countries this number is higher (3.6% in the US)1. Millions of workers worldwide are 
employed in auto manufacturing, auto parts, and supplies manufacturing as well as 
service and after sales care and other derivative industries. The auto industry produces 
more than 800 million cars globally. More than 250 million vehicles are produced in the 
United States. Despite the numbers, the level of interdependence caused by globalization 
is hard to quantify. Suppliers and clients are spread around the world in a web of 
relationships and obligations to one another.  
The economic crisis of the mid to late 2000’s did not have an equal impact across 
countries, companies, and employees. For example, in 2009, the dramatic impact of the 
recession followed by a restructuring in the US automotive industry was not fully 
mirrored in other mature markets in Europe or Japan. In the meantime, a very different 
trend was observed in major emerging economies with large domestic markets such as 
China, India, and Brazil, which experienced rising output as well as increased sales of 
motor vehicles. Many opportunities for mergers and acquisitions were present around the 
world. The crisis may have been a chance for Indian and Chinese auto manufacturers to 
expand their markets and become world players. Chinese auto manufacturers, for 
example,have since cut into the markets of US car manufacturers – particularly where 
environmental standards are less stringent. 
The poor performance of US automakers was exacerbated by the 2008 financial 
                                                     
1  Cole, David, et al. Car Research Memorandum The Impact of a Major Contraction of the Detroit 
Three Automakers. PhD Thesis. Ann Arbor: Car Center for Automotive Research, 2008. 
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crisis, which was then held responsible for the automotive crisis. The effects of the 
financial crisis were more immediate on the employees than the shareholders. Therefore 
the workers were reluctant to accept mass cuts in wages, pensions, and jobs from the 
firms. The firms in turn were made more vulnerable by decreased lending and 
unavailability of capital for their survival. 
This study consists of nine sections including an introduction and a conclusion. 
Following the introduction and literature review, the third section analyzes the 
relationship between the financial crisis and the auto industry. Then follows a fourth 
section: a review of the North American market. First a general analysis will be 
predsented of American auto manufacturers, namely GM, Ford, and Chrysler (the Big 
Three), and of their troubled state due to the crisis. Three phenomena augmented the 
crisis: cost of fuel, cost of labor, and unavailability of credit.  Industry data and related 
facts will be listed to demonstrate how union workers and the excess of car brands 
influenced the Big Three. A detailed review of the bailout process and its impact on auto 
manufactures follows, along with a discussion of strategies and proposals by the 
corporations. TSecond, there will be an examination of how the crisis hit Canada, and 
how the Automotive Products Trade Agreement affected Canadian auto manufacturers. 
There will be a detailed review of the conflict between the Canadian Auto Workers labor 
union, car manufacturers, and the government.  
Section five focuses on the European Union, including the auto markets of Russia, 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. While the auto market in Europe 
was relatively mature, both the luxury segment and massed-produced car segment were 
both hit. Auto companies reacted with plant shutdowns and layoffs. Major auto 
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companies demanded subsidies from their respective states. 
Section six recounts the story of the Asian markets, namely China, India, Japan, 
and South Korea. In 2009 car sales in Japan fell to their lowest levels in the last thirty 
years, while automakers in South Korea demonstrated higher profit margins compared to 
their Japanese and American counterparts. Among major emerging economies with large 
domestic markets, China and India experienced rising output. Governments in all these 
countries subsidize their auto industries. 
Section seven explores the various governments’ role in their automotive 
industries, followed by section eight which gives an analysis and a prediction of the 
future of the automotive industry.  
Facts and examples in this paper seek to highlight the global nature of the crisis. 
Although the focus is on the U.S market, other regions are highlighted as well. The 
purpose of presenting these facts is to provide a thorough and detailed analysis as to 
underlying events and the reactions of affected institutions, including auto manufacturers, 
labor organizations and governments. This paper will attempt to reflect on the causes of 
the financial crisis and associated issues of moral hazard and agency risk. 
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2. Literature Review 
In their book The Great Book of Automobiles, Michael Bowler, Giuseppe 
Guzzardi, and Enzo Rizzo once said, “As a symbol, more than almost any other 
invention, the automobile has come to represent the 20th century and its technological 
and commercial evolution. The automobile captures and reflects the great changes that 
took place during 100 tumultuous years.”2 This quote indicates the very important role 
the automotive industry plays in the global economic structure. The ILO (International 
Labor Organization) reports that the auto industry has today become a major source of 
employment worldwide. “The global workforce total probably climbed to just under 10 
million by the end of 2007. According to a report in 2008 by the US independent think 
tank the Economic Policy Institute, some 3.3 million jobs in the United States alone are 
dependent on the continuing fortunes of the country’s car producers.”3 
Therefore, when financial crisis in 2008 hit the global economy, it hit the car 
industry with real intensity. The crisis in the global car industry has lead to huge job 
losses. All the world’s major car companies announced a decrease in hours, reductions of 
labor forces, or even closures. The largest car company and indeed the largest multi-
national for much of the twentieth century – General Motors – was in its death throes 
with increasingly desperate interventions by the US government to keep it alive. In 
January 2009, the Federal government used $24.9 billion of the $700 billion bank bailout 
fund to rescue two of the Big Three: $17.4 billion for General Motors and Chrysler, $6 
                                                     
2  Bowler, Michael, Giuseppe Guzzardi and Enzo Rizzo . The Great Book of Automobiles. New 
York: White Star, 2004. 35. 
3  International Labor Organization. The crisis and the future of the automobile industry: Putting the 
spark back into the automobile industry. 1 August 2009. 5 June 2012 
<http://www.ilo.org/global/publications/magazines-and-journals/world-of-work-
magazine/articles/WCMS_115469/lang--en/index.htm>. 
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billion for GMAC, and $1.5 billion for Chrysler Financial.4 Kimberly Amadeo, President 
of WorldMoneyWatch.com, gave the reason for this in her published article, The Auto 
Industry Bailout – Why GM, Ford and Chrysler Asked For Government Loans. She 
thinks the purpose of the government subsidies was to provide operating cash for GM and 
Chrysler, and to keep auto loans available for car buyers even though many opposed the 
bailout. She claims the U.S. automakers brought their near-bankruptcy on themselves by 
not retooling for an energy efficient era, thereby reducing their competitiveness in the 
global market.5  
Besides the US, in Canada the federal and Ontario governments provided the 
Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. automakers with 4 billion Canadian dollars ($3.29 billion) 
in emergency loans. As the Canadian Prime Minister explained on Dec. 20, 2008, "In 
Ontario, we've got thousands of people and their families who rely on the auto industry to 
be on firm ground, so they can put food on the table and keep a roof over their heads. ... 
No state or province employs more workers, and we're not going to give that up."6 
Meanwhile, in Europe and Asia, car manufacturers all got a certain amount of 
government subsidies. Government bailouts became a necessary means to ensure many 
automotive manufacturers’ survival. 
However, government help was not the only solution. The auto industry has today 
become a major source of employment worldwide. A recent ILO briefing paper suggests 
that in 2004 about 8.4 million people around the world worked in automotive production 
                                                     
4 Amadeo, Timberly. About.com. 28 March 2012. 3 July 2012 
<http://useconomy.about.com/od/criticalssues/a/auto_bailout.htm>. 
5 Amadeo, Timberly. About.com. 
6 Noronha, Charmaine. Canada, Ontario to Provide $3.29 Billion in Automaker Loans. 21 December 
2008. 4 July 2012 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/12/20/AR2008122001952.html>. 
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(including the manufacturers and component firms): around 2 million in Europe, over 1.6 
million in China, 1.1 million in North America, and 750,000 in both Russian and Japan, 
as well as smaller but still significant numbers elsewhere. The global workforce total 
probably climbed to just under 10 million by the end of 2007, the ILO reports.7 Any 
solution must therefore take these workers into account. 
Thomas A. Kochan, from the MIT Institute for Work and Employment Research 
(US), concurred. “We need more than a financial bailout. The challenge at hand is to 
forge a new social contract for the auto industry, to understand the workplace and to 
engage workers, employers but also other stakeholders.”8 Barry Bluestone, professor of 
political economy at Northeastern University (US), linked this approach with the 
necessity of re-examining social relations in the sector, saying: “There is a need for a 
fundamental change in what the automotive industry builds and how we build these 
products, but also in the social relations between employers and unions.”9 It illustrates 
how significantly the automotive unions perform during a crisis, and how important it is 
to deal with the relationship between car manufacturers and union workers.  The United 
Autoworkers’ Union (UAW) in turn points to sacrifices made by the workers, including 
modifications to the 2007 collective bargaining agreement negotiated with the company 
and to employee benefits. A similar process was undertaken in Canada, where the 
Canadian Autoworkers Union (CAW) reached a provisional settlement with the company 
for a new collective agreement in May in 2009, as part of the overall restructuring. 
According to the article “Automobile Industry Crisis” published in the New York 
                                                     
7 International Labor Organization 
8  Noronha, Charmaine 
9  International Labor Organization 
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Times in 2011, many of the excesses of the past — overproduction, bloated vehicle 
lineups, expensive rebates — are gone. Carmakers have shed workers, plants and brands 
in order to save their companies.10 The auto industry is on a journey, in other words, 
which will move it away from dependence on the gas-guzzling high-emission vehicles of 
the past. US President Barack Obama has linked his government’s intervention in the 
auto industry with a strategic move to curb fuel consumption. The need for progress in 
developing cleaner vehicles and cleaner fuels has also been identified by the global union 
federation for the industry, the International Metalworkers’ Federation, in a statement by 
its executive committee in February 2009. The ILO briefing paper also said, “The 
economic crisis could be turned into an opportunity to reduce the industry’s carbon 
footprint and create green jobs. Many measures already adopted by governments favor 
investments in more environmentally friendly vehicles.”11 Reuters reported that the 
Congressional Budget Office said in a report issued in  2009 that U.S. federal policies to 
promote electric vehicles would cost $7.5 billion through 2019. Honda, Toyota, Ford, 
Chevrolet, etc. are now all producing all-electric cars and plug-in hybrids, which is part 
of the auto industry's solution to reach increasingly stringent fuel economy standards 
designed to cut emissions and lessen the dependence on oil.  
Previous research on this subject has given a brief picture regarding the crisis,  
with many different commentators giving their views regarding a certain firm and its 
gains and losses. Other research done in the past has focused specifically on a single 
nation and the effects suffered in its market; therefore the framework for this study will 
be to cover a broader perspective relative to all sides involved in the crisis. This paper 
                                                     
10  The New York Times. Automotive Industry Crisis. 25 May 2011. 2 September 2012 
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/auto_industry/index.html>. 
11 International Labor Organization 
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will try to merge all of the work done by many previous writers, commentators, and 
analysts in this field so that it will give the reader a much broader idea of the event and its 
causes as well as effects.  
 9
3. Financial Crisis and the Automotive Industry 
3.1 Effects of the financial crisis on the auto industry 
The automotive industry is among the sectors that was hit the most by the 
recession. Demand for cars fell sharply, deepening the economic downturn in major car-
producing countries. Because of the strong linkages with other parts of the economy, the 
final impact of a shock in the industry on the broader economy was sizable. 
The reduction in car sales from mid-2008 to 2009 was magnified by the lack of 
access to credit. Econometric estimations indicate that tight credit conditions could 
explain more than 80% of the collapse in car sales at the end of 2008 in the United States 
and in Canada.12 Indeed, the high cost of credit and the inability to obtain auto loans on 
affordable terms prompted buyers to postpone purchases they might have otherwise 
made. In addition, the growing average longevity of motor vehicles that has been 
observed in recent years may have favored these behaviors.  
In 2008, a series of damaging blows drove the Big Three to the verge of 
bankruptcy. The financial crisis played a role, as GM was unable to obtain credit to buy 
Chrysler. As consumer credit tightened, sales fell sharply. As mentioned, it became much 
harder for people with average or poor credit to obtain a bank loan to buy a car. During 
2007, nearly 2 million new U.S. cars were purchased with funds from home equity loans. 
Such funding was considerably less available in 2008. 13 Moreover, the instability of the 
                                                     
12  Similar financial conditions were found in all G7 countries, except France. In the United 
Kingdom and Japan, tight financial conditions were estimated to also influence sales , albeit with a lag. The 
historical pattern would suggest that the financial aspects of the crisis affected the automotive industry only 
in the first quarter of 2009, but it is likely that adjustment speeds were faster in the current crisis. 
13  Dash, Eric. Strategies for Car Shopping in a Time of Tighter Credit. 20 November 2008. 2 August  
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job market and individual consumer finances discouraged consumers who already had a 
working vehicle from taking on a new loan and payments, which affected almost all 
major manufacturers. Therefore, without improvement in the financial markets, there was 
little way to provide forward momentum for car sales. 
Meanwhile, major car manufacturers had in recent years focused on 
manufacturing SUVs and large pickups, which were much more profitable than smaller, 
fuel-efficient cars. Manufacturers made a 15% to 20% profit margin on an SUV, 
compared to 3% or less on a regular car.14 When gasoline prices rose above $4 per gallon 
in 2008, Americans stopped buying the big vehicles and Big Three sales and profitability 
plummeted. Robert Samuelson advocated a more consistent energy policy, arguing, “Wild 
swings between low and high fuel prices have crippled the U.S. industry by erratically 
shifting buyer preferences – to and from SUVs.”15  
Louis Uchitelle reported in the New York Times that some 20% of the entire 
national manufacturing sector was still tied to the automotive industry. The annual 
capacity of the industry was 17 million cars in 2006; sales in 2008 fell to an annual rate 
of only 10 million vehicles made in the U.S. and Canada. All the automakers and their 
vast supplier network accounted for 2.3% of the U.S. economic output, down from 3.1% 
in 2006 and as much as 5% in the 1990s. The car manufacturers can only make a profit 
when sales are at least 12 million, the Big Three when sales are at least 15 million.16 By 
                                                                                                                                                              
2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/automobiles/23LEND.html?pagewanted=all>. 
14  Cloud, John. Why the SUV is All the Rage. 24 Feb 2003. 5 August 2012 
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1004283,00.html>. 
15  The Daily Beast. How to Bail Out General Motors. 4 November 2008. 6 August 2012 
<http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/11/15/how-to-bail-out-general-motors.html>. 
16  Uchitelle, Louis. If Detroit Falls, Foreign Makers Could Be Buffer. 16 November 2008. 7 August 
2012.  
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December 19, 2008, oil prices had fallen to $33.87 per barrel, but the automotive crisis 
continued.17  
3.2 Cyclicality of the automotive industry  
Purchasing an automobile is discretionary spending. Economic activity in the 
automotive industry usually moves in line with the overall business cycle, but the 
amplitude of the cycle is higher. The volatility of the industry is also higher than that of 
the manufacturing industries as a whole.  
A high correlation is also found between car sales and private consumption, which 
in turn accounts for a large part of total output. The relation seems to be particularly 
vigorous in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and in some smaller 
OECD countries (Figure 3-2). It was generally stable in Japan, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom, while it declined noticeably in France (Figure 3-1). 
Fluctuations in activity in the automotive industry displayed stronger amplitude 
than the economy-wide and the manufacturing business cycle (Table 3-1). The variance 
of automobile production growth was also larger than the one of business investment 
growth. As in the wider economy, the fluctuations appear to have declined since the 
1990s in the automotive industry. This is largely due to improved inventory management 
techniques and more stable car sales.18 
                                                     
17  Webster, Larry. GM in Crisis—5 Reasons Why America's Largest Car Company Teeters on the 
Edge Read more: GM in Crisis—5 Reasons Why America's Largest Car Company Teeters on the Edge - 
Popular Mechanics . 18 November 2008. 8 August 2012 
<http://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/news/industry/4292379>. 
18  Hauph , David, Annabelle Mourougane and Olivier Chantal. "The Automotive Industry in and 
Beyond the Crisis." Economics Department Working Papers No. 745 (2010): 36. 
 
Figure 3-1 Correlation between private consumption and car sales (Quarter
Table 3-1 Automobile production is more volatile than GDP and investment 
(Standard deviation of 
quarter growth rates 2000-2009) 
 
quarter-on quarter growth rates)
12
-on-
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2 G7 GDP and automobile production growth (quarter
   Bundesbank; ISTAT; INSEE; Datastream; OECD Economic Outlook 86 
database; OECD, Main Economic Indicators database
-on-
rates) 
 
13
quarter growth 
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4. Crisis in North America 
4.1 Crisis in the United States 
4.1.1 General analysis 
In 2008, a global recession struck which greatly affected the United States’ 
economy. This recession had many negative impacts on various sectors of the American 
economy. One of the most prominent sectors was the automotive industry. Even before 
the recession there were many factors such as declining automobile sales and the 
lessening amount of credit present in the business which went on to create a more 
disastrous and widespread automotive industry crisis.  
Figure 4-1 U.S. auto sales 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
[The above figure summarizes a brief picture of the slump in sales in automobiles in the 
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U.S market.] 
 
The U.S government intervened in this matter since it threatened massive job 
losses as well as posed the potential for huge damage to the overall manufacturing sector. 
The government provided a financial bailout in order to support the companies in 
restructuring. Both GM and Chrysler filed separately for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection.  
Later on, General Motors emerged as a new firm from the bankruptcy. It was now 
majority-owned by the Treasury Department of the United States government. Chrysler 
was now owned by the United Auto Workers union as well as Fiat S.P.A. After their 
emergence from bankruptcy, they also terminated many of their agreements with their 
dealerships; General Motors also had to discontinue many of its brands due to its 
bankruptcy proceedings.  
Of all the Big Three firms, only Ford survived without entering into bankruptcy 
mainly because of a huge line of credit that it got in 2007. This automotive crisis was a 
global phenomenon, but the car manufacturers in United States were more affected by 
this crisis as compared to any of the other foreign manufacturers.  
Currently, all of the major American manufacturers have gone on to increase their 
sales as part of their ongoing strategies. This has resulted in some success as they have 
recently posted profits regarding their sales figures. As of 2012, the whole of the 
automotive industry had succeeded in its recovery efforts up to great extent. General 
Motors posted sales of more than nine million vehicles, which is greater than the sales of 
Toyota.   
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According to many analysts, the automotive crisis in the United States was made 
so much worse mainly because of improper business practices by the big auto comapnies 
there, namely the three that have been mentioned. When comparing the big American 
firms with other global giants, especially those which originate in Asia, then it can be 
seen that the Asian firms were not facing similar problems, even those whose businesses 
were situated in the U.S.    
One of the main factors which increased the severity of this crisis even more was 
the expensive cost of fuel; this was linked to the global oil crisis, which occurred before 
the automotive crisis. The rise in fuel prices caused the general consumer to shift in their 
demand and they now opted to buy less of the larger vehicles such as pickup trucks or 
SUV’s as compared to the other vehicles available in the market, since the larger vehicles 
tend to use more fuel.  
Another major factor which aggravated the crisis was the considerably high cost 
of labor, which was greater in unionized industries. This included salaries, healthcare 
benefits, pensions, and other job-related benefits. Management, in an effort to procure 
labor peace, granted many concessions to their unions, which resulted in significant 
legacy costs as well as uncompetitive cost structures.  
Moreover, the total amount of cars being sold in the United States market were  
significantly tied up with the credit of home equity lines, with some twenty four percent 
of total sales being financed through this way in  2006. When these loans’ availability 
dried up due to the 2008 mortgage crisis, sales of vehicles declined drastically, from over 
fifteen million in 2006 to just above ten million in 2009.  
According to many consumer reports published in 2006, the best cars preferred by 
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critics as well as the consumers were of Asian origins. In some reports the favor toward 
Asian firms was so immense that the reports considered all of the top ten cars to be from 
Asian manufacturers, especially giving credit to the Japanese companies. (Figure 4-2) At 
the same time the Big Three American firms were making job cuts. An example of this is 
from Michigan which lost eighty three thousand auto manufacturing jobs between the 
fifteen year timeline from 1993-2008. Much of this cut was associated with the Big Three 
manufacturers.    
 At the time of the mentioned job cut period, many auto manufacturing jobs were 
created elsewhere, especially by the foreign firms in cities such as in Tennessee, 
Alabama, Kentucky, North and South Carolina, Texas, Mississippi, and Virginia. The 
total number of new jobs was more than 90,000 jobs. This also pressured the local 
American car-manufacturing firms in competitive terms. 
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Figure 4-2 Average Annual Sales for GM, Chrysler dealerships and their 
competitors (2005-2008) 
 
[As can be seen from above, the sales of the Big Three firms were significantly lower as 
compared to their rival firms in the United States even before the start of the automotive 
crisis.] 
 19
Figure 4-3 Hyundai USA monthly sales: 2008 - 2010 
 
Source: GoodCarBadCar.net 
[The above figure shows how Hyundai, which is a foreign manufacturer in the United 
States, performed during and after the crisis. It can be seen that foreign firms did well to 
cope with the crisis as compared to the local American firms.] 
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Figure 4-4 Hyundai U.S. sales growth vs. overall U.S. market growth 
 
Source: GoodCarBadCar.net 
[This chart also shows how prominent the foreign car manufacturers such as Hyundai 
were in growth which came after the crisis. ] 
4.1.2 Industrial data 
 
During the first half of 2008, the total employees in the Big Three firms, including 
car-dealers and parts suppliers, totaled at more than one and a half million. When looking 
at the entire employment figures related to the automotive industry – including the Big 
Three – then the total personnel this industry employed numbered at around 3.1 million 
in the U.S,  including after-market service businesses. During the crisis, the employment 
rate in the automotive industry declined. 
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According to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics the proper breakdown 
of workers in the automotive sector until September 2008 was as follows,: repair 
operations involved eight hundred and sixty-four thousand personnel, parts 
manufacturing involved five hundred and four thousand personnel, wholesale operations 
involved three hundred and forty thousand personnel, manufacturing involved one 
hundred and fourteen thousand personnel, and dealer operations had 1.2 million 
personnel.  
Also, some estimated 2 million personnel were relying on the healthcare offered 
by the automotive industry, and seven hundred and seventy-five thousand retired 
personnel collected their pensions from this industry. General Motors was a leading 
employer, directly employing more than one hundred and twenty thousand employees in 
the United States.  
The hourly wages being given to workers were relatively the same when 
comparing the offerings by the Big Three firms and the rest of the automotive industries. 
For example, the basic hourly wage earned by any UAW worker working for any of the 
Big Three was close to what was earned by any Honda or Toyota worker at their U.S 
plants. The average wage for an experienced UAW worker was close to $28 an hour in 
early 2008.  
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Figure 4-5 Employment in Motor Vehicle and Parts Manufacturing and US Motor 
Vehicle Production, Seasonally Adjusted, 2007-2012
 
2007-2012 
Source: United States Department of Labor 
 
[The chart above shows the number of automotive job loss during the recession, which 
does not include employees from after-market services.] 
 
For any new worker the rate of hourly wage was close to $14 for an hour, 
therefore experience counted significantly here as the senior workers were offered better 
pay. A huge cost difference between the U.S. employees working for any firm with 
foreign origin and the UAW members came in fringe benefits. Here it should also be 
noted that UAW has been regarded as one of the most successful unions in America in 
terms of fighting for health benefits as well as generous pensions for its members.  
The total compensation is often defined as the total cost of labor afforded by the 
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firms, and for General Motors it was close to $70 per hour, while for Toyota it was about 
$45 per hour. In this sense the average cost difference that existed between foreign 
nameplate firms and the Big Three was about $25 per hour. This difference was 
considered to be enormous and impacted all the departments in the firm, especially 
wages, pension, and healthcare. “Pay rate should be according to experience of the 
employee.”19  
Looking at the average annual wages for Big Three’s production workers then it 
was estimated to be around $67,500 in the year 2007, and about $80,000 for more skilled 
personnel. The overall ratio of retirees to workers varied in the Big Three. For every 
active worker at General Motors there were some four retirees calculated until the year 
2006, at Chrysler the retirees or dependents numbered around two for a worker, and at 
Ford this was somewhere close to one and a half per worker. This data translated as the 
cost burden of legacy labor being much higher for General Motors as compared to any of 
its competitors.      
According to many critics and business analysts, these huge labor costs, along 
with other costs such as product development, kept the Big Three firms from developing 
any high quality product which was essential for profits as well as for survival in a 
competitive environment.     
The employees of foreign nameplate firms working in the United States were 
mainly non-unionized, whereas the Big Three firms were bound to their workforce 
through contracts with UAW. According to data provided by UAW, the total labor costs 
represented about eight percent of the entire cost of manufacturing as well as selling an 
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automobile in 2006.  
Here the great majority of costs came at creating a vehicle and transferring it to its 
dealership authority, and preparing it for sales which included engineering, marketing, 
design, and executive compensation.  Any other related costs were not considered as 
either direct or indirect form of manufacturing labor.  
In 2005 a story was uncovered by some of the leading news outlets claiming that 
the Big Three had paid more than ten thousand idled workers their complete salary and 
benefits in a program called the “Jobs Bank.” This program was created during the 
UAW’s labor contracts in 1984 with the Big Three, the purpose of which was to provide 
protection to the salaries of employees and discourage any sort of layoffs which might be 
expected later on. This was a significant point in the contracts between the automakers 
and UAW.     
Here, the main interest of the union was to save jobs through a plan which 
guaranteed pay and other related benefits for the union members, especially those who 
were laid off due to any sort of technological progress or any new restructuring in the 
plant. In many of the cases the employees were being paid through the Jobs Bank only if 
they had exhausted both the company’s and the government’s unemployment benefits. 
Many of those employees were later placed in retraining.  
Due to the process of Jobs Bank, the American automakers were obligated 
through contract to pay some ninety percent of the benefits and union wages to members 
of UAW who were not working, even when their manufacturing plants had been closed. 
According to this agreement, General Motors would pay out more than two billion dollars 
in Jobs Bank payments over a period of four years, Chrysler would allocate some $450 
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million for its own program alongside another $50 million which was reserved for 
salaried union employees, and for similar purposes Ford had also set aside some $950 
million.  
According to many analysts, this Jobs Bank program was one of the biggest 
problems the Big Three firms faced during the automotive crisis and even before it. This 
program gave enormous amount of benefits to workers which resulted in a great deal of 
financial capital being badly appropriated; capital that could have been used by the car 
manufacturers for many other different things that might have given them a better chance 
of survival during the 2008 crisis. For example, they could have opted to invest more in 
their car manufacturing technology which was facing stiff competition from its Asian 
rivals, or they could have just used their capital to introduce new environmentally 
friendly technologies which could have also boosted their image in the general public.  
This enormous sum of cash that was allotted in the Jobs Bank could also have 
been used in advertising campaigns by the Big Three firms. It is very important to create 
a level of confidence between the firms and the consumers by inform consumers about 
the qualities of the firm, how it intends to contribute towards the society in general, and 
what impact it already has made, all of which can be accomplished through advertising.  
Looking at the number of brands held by the American firms. General Motors had 
a total of eight brands which were sold in America, which does not include GM’s 
overseas brands such as Opel, Vauxhall, Holden, and GM Korea. It liquidated one of its 
brands because of bankruptcy. This stands in stark contrast to its rivals such as Toyota,  
which has only three brands in the U.S market. “Lesser number of brands is often more 
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preferred by big firms.”20  
“It is a very well known fact that more brands demand more marketing as well as 
product development expenditures,”21 this drives incremental costs which is relative to 
competition. According to some analysts, if General Motors could have reduced its 
overall brands from eight to three that would have saved them some five billion dollars 
on an annual basis. “Reduced brands are also favorable for many other reasons such as 
less expertise is required to maintain the business in terms of management and the 
common employees.”22  
“Less brands give the common people more obvious choices to choose from.”23 If 
General Motors had fewer brands then it could have focused more on what the people 
demanded and provided them just that. In this way the pressure from the competition 
would have been relieved up to a certain extent as well.  
Fewer brands would have given General Motors a better chance to survive a 
market crash scenario in which consumers’ ability to buy reduced drastically and where 
they often tend to sell instead of buying, something very similar to the 2008 crisis. 
Therefore this is also the reason that the Big Three suffered massive losses while their 
foreign counterparts with fewer brands were able to avoid a similar fate. “A reduction in 
the total number of brands demands consolidation or closing from the dealerships which 
often tends to change the franchise laws and this is a very expensive process for the 
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firm.”24 For example, if General Motors was to retire one of its brands like Opel, then this 
whole process might have cost them some two billion dollars.  
Taking a look at the control and number of dealerships related to the U.S-based 
auto manufacturers. Chrysler and General Motors had some ten thousand dealerships 
between them alone, which employed an estimated five hundred thousand personnel. 
Besides this, General Motors also had many different other small dealership units which 
were spread across all of its eight brands. These dealerships were well protected and 
properly defined by the state laws, which made them very difficult to close without 
having to pay large fees. This made dealership reform challenging barring some  sort of 
bankruptcy protection.  
Looking at the bondholders, General Motors was carrying some forty three billion 
dollars worth of debt burden on itself. This also came with nearly three billion dollars in 
interest per year on its debt. If the bondholders could have swapped the stakes for equity, 
which does not pay any interest, then General Motors’ overall interest as well as debt 
burden could have been reduced greatly. “Reducing the debt burden is necessary for any 
firm in order to achieve better targets.”25 
However it was also a fact that the bondholders of General Motors and Chrysler 
completely rejected any offer of debt swap, complaining that it provided unequal 
treatment to them as compared to UAW. They cited that their overall debt was more than 
twice that of UAW’s healthcare trust. In this scenario, UAW would have been offered 
some fifty to forty percent stake in the newly formed Chrysler and General Motors 
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respectively, whereas the bondholders would have just gained 33 cents per dollar for 
Chrysler and ten percent stake in the new General Motors. With the approval of U.S 
Treasury, the original offer for the bondholders was later on amended in order to include 
a further fifteen percent stake.  
The bondholders also complained that the United States government had 
interfered in matters, which had bypassed the bigger precedence of claims by the debt 
holders in favor of the UAW due to UAW’s political contributions to the President of the 
United States Barack Obama. There were even cases where the President openly accused 
the bondholders of Chrysler for being speculators. This happened after they rejected the 
final offer from the government which in turn made Chrysler file for bankruptcy. A 
General Motors bondholder described this situation as comparable to a socialist state and 
said that he had not expected this sort of reaction from the government at all.  
Some bondholders of Chrysler claimed to receive death threats after the judge in 
the bankruptcy case rejected a claim to protect the bondholder’s anonymity. The hedge 
funds involved said that their clients varied widely, including university endowments and 
pension funds. Somewhere around seven billion dollars worth of General Motors bonds 
were held by the so called “Mom and Pop-type investors.” One lawyer assessing the case 
described this scenario as common retirees versus autoworker retirees.  
Unsurprisingly, any recapitalization effort would have completely cleared out the 
value of any existing common stock shares, which had already declined very 
significantly.   
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4.1.3 Impact on the economy 
“The automobile industry is a very important component in the overall American 
economy.”26 Many economists used the data related to this industry that was observed in 
the years 2007 and 2008 in order to make estimates about how a meltdown would 
actually play out in the summer of 2008. This was also done to set proper benchmarks 
which could help the policymakers to understand the proper effect of bankruptcies. 
“Bankruptcy of a business also affects heavily on its related businesses.”27 
These, alongside many other estimates, were greatly discussed by the 
policymakers during late 2008. Many topics were discussed such as what if the Big Three 
were to shut down. In that case it was estimated that the automotive industry would lose 
about quarter of a million jobs which were categorized as highly paid ones. Furthermore 
a loss of about a million highly paid jobs was estimated at the local dealers and suppliers 
end, plus the loss of over one and a half million additional jobs, which were related to 
different other sectors of economy. “More often the victims of job losses are the less 
experienced workers.”28 
A total estimate when combining all of these job losses put the total tally at close 
to three million in job losses. Other estimates calculated that the shutdown of the Big 
Three firms would cause a great decline in the national personal income level, which 
would occur by some one hundred and fifty billion dollars in the first year and some four 
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hundred billion dollars over the next three years. Many economists also concluded that if 
Chrysler and General Motors were to disappear completely then there could be an 
increment of about a million imported vehicles every year,  enough to remove some 
twenty five billion dollars from the American economy. It would also reduce the GDP by 
about 0.2 percent on an annual basis.  
Figure 4-6 General Motors stock prices (10/15/07-5/29/08) 
 
Source: Marketoracle.co.uk 
[The above graph shows the impact of the automotive crisis on the prices of stock of 
General Motors. It clearly shows how much negative effect the firm suffered,  not just 
because of a lack of public interest in buying vehicles but rather through the 
mismanagement from the top level which went on to cause such a crash in prices.] 
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Assessing, some of the claims which asserted that any failure would not be a 
threat to the economy, in the later half of 2008, some investment managers claimed that if 
the key automakers, especially the Big Three firms, were to shut down completely then 
many of the foreign firms such as Toyota and Honda would find it easy to set up new 
plants in America. This process would not create any long-term loss to the economy 
especially concerning the employment sector related to the automotive industries.  
Some analysts also stated that any giant corporation failing may be a threat for the 
auto industry in general, but it was better to liquidate the firms completely rather than 
keeping them up artificially in the hope of any improvement expected in the future. In 
this scenario, those who presented their perspectives compared the 2008 crisis to the 
dismantling of Daewoo in South Korea during 1999. The impact of the decision to 
dismantle Daewoo on the South Korean economy was much greater than that by the Big 
Three automaker firms in the United States. “In troubled times, firms often tend to focus 
on help from the government’s treasury.”29  
Focusing on the Korean example, the overall belief that Korean conglomerates 
especially Daewoo, were just too huge to fail caused many of the investors and bankers to 
waste their money continuously in bailouts, despite their overall poor business plans and 
numerous unprofitable projects. The result of this was that Daewoo was not able to pay 
off its loans. “Selling of assets is a common practice for any firm facing financial 
crisis.”30  
Once this perception that bigger firms were immune to failure was dispelled, 
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many large conglomerates were no longer considered to be safe for investments. 
Therefore the investors and bankers started creating new opportunities in those areas 
which had been starved for capital in the past such as small firms and entrepreneurs. “No 
firm is immune from collapse.”31 
This caused the Korean GDP to actually recover better than expected after the 
unwinding of Daewoo. Another similar example comes from Japan during the decade of 
1990’s, where the banks allowed their funding to flow into the unprofitable firms in order 
to keep them alive. They also argued that those firms were just too huge to fail. “Failure 
of big firms often tends to bring mass unemployment.”32 However, many of those firms 
were greatly debt-ridden and therefore required much more in order to survive than just 
bailout funds. Many economists in Japan described this process the nation’s “loser 
paradise.” It was also seen that the Japanese economy properly recovered only after this 
paradise period ended. “High debt is often the main cause of any firm’s demise.”33 
Many industry experts, media commentators, and academics made a number of 
recommendations concerning the restructuring as well as reforming of the Big Three 
firms. These recommendations included introducing a method of court-supervision, 
which could assist in reorganizing the firms. Although a court process is considered to be 
very lengthy, it often provides the best possible solution for all of the stakeholders 
involved. Moreover a court process often tends to have the backing of the federal 
government, especially in this case where the firms had relied so much on the 
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government that it should have been a choice worth more focus for all the parties 
involved.  
Other reorganizing processes included allowing the public to have more stake in 
the firms which were heavily affected because of the crisis. Although this process might 
bring some capital from the general public, it is still far from attaining success as the 
people may show hesitance in taking stake in such firms when those firms are deemed so 
fragile by numerous open sources such as media outlets. “The failing of any big firm can 
result in massive unemployment in related sectors as well.”34  
4.1.4 Alternatives to bankruptcy  
 
The bankruptcy-related topics are centered on the code of conduct known as 
Chapter 11 ; this is also known as restructuring and is commonly used in giving a 
glimmer of hope to a corporation. This involves renegotiating contracts, selling the assets 
or other related components of business for the sake of attaining cash, obtaining 
forgiveness in debt, or just a general reform within the corporation.  
The alternative to the Chapter 11 is known as Chapter 7. This is put into use in 
order to liquidate or shut down any firm or to sell its components. The proceeds attained 
through Chapter 7 go to the debt holders. In both of the mentioned processes, the 
shareholders usually lose their investments and the control of the corporation is given to 
the debt holders of the corporation. During the automotive crisis of 2008 it was often 
debated as to which chapter to apply in order to address the crisis. Chapter 11 was 
ultimately thought to be a more feasible choice.  
There are many arguments in favor of Chapter 11. According to analysts this 
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would have made the automotive industry more sustainable as well as competitive; the 
airline industry was given as an example in this case. Chapter 11 was also thought to 
allow the city of Detroit to fully reorganize its job market, which was feared by many to 
be about to go through immense losses. “Job markets go through immense jolts when a 
big firm collapses.”35  
Many opponents of a bailout for the auto industry thought that the problems of 
automakers could be resolved in a better way through bankruptcy court, which involves 
authorizing legal rights to dissolve any existing contracts and shedding the costs and any 
debts which the firm can not afford any more. The downside is that “court proceedings 
tend to take a lot of time.”36  
The opponents also suggested that complete control of the government over the 
car industry would be ineffective in solving the problems since the overall actions of the 
industry could be influenced by official governmental policies. Many politicians 
supported the bankruptcy procedure as compared to the federal government’s aid to the 
automotive industry, but none proposed any solid solution to the problem which was 
acceptable to all of the parties involved in the crisis.  
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds which were introduced by the 
United States government in 2008 involved the purchase of assets as well as equity from 
the leading financial institutions in order to strengthen the financial sector. This was 
signed into  law in October 2008. It is important to mention TARP because many 
commentators as well as politicians supported this program as a way to help the 
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automotive industry. 
Critics of Chapter 11 argued that as a restructuring process the consumers would 
be rather unwilling to purchase any vehicle from the bankrupt automaker, since the 
ability of automakers to support their warranty is the main thing which affects consumers’ 
decision to purchase . Advocates have noted that either the private lenders or the 
government could have created a fund which would have enabled warranty coverage.  
General Motors argued that a bankruptcy procedure could threaten jobs as well as 
the solvency of the American federal government’s pension programs such as Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The Director of PBGC said that General Motors 
had failed to provide an answer related to the funding status of its pension plan. The 
pension funds of General Motors were thought to have enough cash for its related 
obligations but some reports suggested that the pension could be under-funded by some 
$18 billion by the end of 2008. “Pensioners often face cuts when a firm goes into any 
financial trouble.”37Chapter 11 bankruptcy is defined as prepackaged when all of the 
important stakeholders have agreed on what would happen during the proceedings of 
bankruptcy; this enables them to have much more certainty regarding any outcomes as 
well as less time spent in bankruptcy protection. Many advocates indicated that this form 
of prepackaged bankruptcy is often more preferable, while its critics argued that it was 
very unlikely that all the relative stakeholders could agree on the given terms while 
staying outside of bankruptcy.  
A government facilitated solution was advocated by the Brookings Institution in 
which the assets of Big Three firms were to be transferred or sold to some other 
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corporation which was considered to be better in deploying employee and plant 
resources. The Brookings Institution further stated that the government in this scenario 
could play a very productive role by providing short-term infusion of capital alongside 
strict repayment rules, which would require the automakers to give away or sell their 
overall assets to other more successful firms.  
In the statement it was also argued that the cars made by the Big Three were not 
entirely preferred by the American public. This problem could not be solved through 
means of bankruptcy restructuring which is focused initially on considerations related to 
cost-side like benefits and wages. “Job related benefits are often cut when a firm faces 
any financial crisis.”38 
Another key notion advocated was that the private industry should create a 
partnership alongside government that can transform the entire automotive industry; this 
could be done by creating a so-called “high mileage vehicle economy” that is based on 
fuel cell and hybrid cars whose features includes less carbon emission and more mileage 
for the general consumer who utilizes it. “Investment in technology keeps ahead in 
competition.”39 
The loans for such a project were sought on an urgent basis alongside 
conditioning. This notion also included a U.S strategy for creating an automotive 
technological leadership that would greatly improve the energy, climate, and national 
security, and the overall American global competitiveness. “Technology can be a very 
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important factor in any competitive environment.”40 There were also many arguments 
presented against government intervention in which some sources stated that by bailing 
out the failing firms, the government was confiscating capital from the productive 
sources of economy and providing it to the failing ones. By helping the firms with 
unsustainable or obsolete business models, the federal government prevented their 
resources from being completely liquidated and should have instead made it available for 
other firms which could have put those resources into better and more productive use.  
“A very essential element of a growing a free market is that the successes as well 
as failures should be allowed to happen whenever they are earned.”41 Therefore through 
the process of bailout which involves the resources given from the failing firms rather 
than to the successful ones, this natural procedure is reversed.   
In December of 2008, a prominent opinion column stated that there was no 
bailout present for horse and buggy industries some hundred years ago when cars were 
replacing them, and that the standards of living overall are now greater because the losers 
and winners were determined at that time by the consumers rather than the politicians. 
The writer of this column also blamed the gradual decline of the Big Three firms on the 
economic policies adopted by some states. It also argued that the Japanese car 
manufacturers preferred to build their plants in those U.S states whose policies were not 
as hostile as some other ones.  
In 2009, Ernst & Young reported that the policies which protect companies can 
cause reduced incentives for many entrepreneurs to invest in their innovative ideas and 
for any large corporation to invest in R&D because they do not face any competitive 
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pressure which can help them to constantly improve their produced items. This pressure 
is very essential for them to maintain or improve their share in market. “Firms should 
invest appropriately towards R&D.”42  
Many critics also urged the U.S government to remove the senior management of 
the Big Three firms, especially that of General Motors. Their main reasoning for this was 
that such removals are very typical in any bailout procedures. In terms of mergers, if two 
or more firms from either the Big Three or any other crisis-impacted firms were to merge 
then that could have allowed a great deal of cost savings, as well as more focus being 
given to the more profitable brands. 
However, the UAW opposed any such move as it may have involved a great deal 
of layoffs. Chrysler and General Motors held many meetings regarding the merger 
process, which went on towards no concrete results. There are many points which are 
associated with the failure of the merger such as the agreed share of resources among the 
firms, the proportion of layoffs in both firms and so on. “Mergers often result in layoffs 
rather than hiring.”43 
The automotive crisis in the U.S can be compared to the scenario faced by British 
Leyland during the decade of 1970’s; at that time the British firm had some thirty-six 
percent of the total market share in U.K. Because of the crisis the British government 
nationalized as well as invested many billions of pounds in the troubled business which at 
that time was facing a great deal of competition from its European counterparts. 
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“Nationalization of a firm often tends to shrink its productive capacity.”44 
British Leyland was also facing many questions regarding the quality of its 
products and therefore this also caused great problems for its ability to compete in an 
ever-competitive environment. In this instance, the firm reduced its product line and 
focused greatly on its profitable ventures, which were the Rover and Austin brands. 
Afterwards, in the 1980’s, the firm had some relative success in terms of models like the 
Austin Metro. 
4.1.5 The review of the bailout processes 
 
In late 2008, a U.S senate hearing took place on the topic of the automotive crisis, 
which included the presence of the management of Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler. 
The heads of the Big Three firms explained that they required the financial assistance of 
some twenty-five billion dollars in order to avoid bankruptcy. At the hearing, the Senate 
was divided on many points in the overall issue.  
In this case the Republican senators were not willing to give any sort of aid; some 
of them even desired bankruptcy as the best possible option since it would then free the 
auto manufacturers from their employment deals with the unions. At the same time the 
Democrats wanted action must be taken sooner rather than later which was in line with 
then President Elect Barack Obama’s stance regarding the matter.  
A senior officer from the Big Three firms was quoted as saying that there might 
be a job loss of more than three million inside the first year of the crisis if the automotive 
industry failed. He also said that it is about much more than just Detroit. The main aim 
here should be to save the U.S economy from any catastrophic meltdown which may 
                                                     
44  Olson, Mancur. A Not-So-Dismal Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 40. 
 40
result from such losses.  
In November 2008, the shares of General Motors fell precipitously to their lowest 
level since the last century’s Great Depression on the rumor that any hope of a bailout 
had diminished. Shares of other car manufacturers such as Ford also fell greatly. 
However, the prices of these shares recovered later on due to the rumors about bipartisan 
progress regarding a bailout. In the same month, an article in the Detroit Free Press 
claimed that the UAW was thinking about ending their Jobs Bank program as a condition 
regarding the federal bailout.  
The leading Democratic Party leaders sent letters to the Big Three firm’s CEOs, 
calling on them to produce a credible restructuring plan by December 2008 which would 
involve significant sacrifices as well as major changes in the ways they conducted their 
businesses if they wanted to expect any assistance from the government. The letter also 
included different  requirements for the different forecasts under various assumptions, 
situation assessments, taxpayer protections, executive and dividend pay restrictions, 
transparent reporting towards an oversight body, and various other approaches which 
were involved in covering the pension and healthcare obligations.  
In December 2008, the Big Three firms submitted to Congressional leaders their 
revised plans which included many drastic measures like lowering the pay of executives, 
an overall reduction in the total number of brands, and the refinancing of company debt. 
After this assessment it was estimated that the total bailout funds required by the firms 
had now increased to more than thirty-four billion dollars. The auto firms also added that 
if help was not provided quickly then things might get worse and the sum of total funding 
might increase even more.    
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Chrysler argued that it required seven billion dollars by the month’s end just to 
stay operational, whereas General Motors requested four billion dollars immediately. In 
an interview, President Obama said that the last thing he wanted to see happen was for 
the auto industry to completely disappear. He also said that he was concerned that the 
government did not want to put tens of billions of dollars into the auto industry only to 
have the firms ask for more later on.   
In the same month, the negotiators for the Congressional bailout revealed the 
terms of a deal which was emerging between the Congress and the White House, 
according to which a fifteen billion dollar short-term bailout for the Big Three firms 
would be overseen by a federal trustee. The Committee for House Financial Services 
released a copy of the then proposed package for financial bailout for the Big Three 
firms.  
This bill proposed an appointment of a trustee to oversee the restructuring efforts 
of the automakers, put restrictions on the bonuses received by the executives of the firms, 
reduced golden parachute packages, and demanded the automakers divest or sell any of 
their privately leased or owned aircraft. “Management of a firm should be an example to 
its employees in terms of living a simple lifestyle.”45  
However the bill failed to pass on December 11, 2008. A statement issued by 
General Motors expressed its great disappointment regarding this failure; they stated that 
they would assess all of their options to carry on with the restructuring and to determine a 
means of getting through the economic crisis. Chrysler stated that it was greatly 
disappointed by the rejection of the bill but that it would continue to pursue any workable 
solution that was essential for the future of the firm.  
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On December 19, 2008, President George W. Bush publicly announced that he 
had given approval to the bailout plan; this would help in providing loans of more than 
seventeen billion dollars to the American carmakers Chrysler and General Motors. He 
also stated that under the current economic conditions it was necessary to allow the 
American auto industry to have the funds and that if this was not done then an immediate 
collapse of the entire auto industry was inevitable, and therefore everything must be done 
in order to avoid it.  
George W. Bush provided some thirteen billion dollars on an immediate basis, 
followed by a pledge of four billion dollars through February 2009. These funds were to 
be available through the Emergency Economic Stabilization act of 2008. In total, 
Chrysler would get four billion dollars, and General Motors would receive more than 
nine billion dollars.  
However, it was also argued that the U.S Treasury lacked the proper authority to 
direct the funds received from TARP towards the automakers because TARP was limited 
to provide help to a selected number of financial institutions which the federal 
government desired to bail out. This was stated under TARP’s Section 102. Another point 
of argument here was that the usage of TARP’s funds towards the automakers was 
something which went against the wishes of Congress since Congress itself issued those 
limitations helping only a selected number of financial institutions.  
This debate was later laid to rest when on December 19, 2008, President George 
W. Bush used his powers to declare that the funds associated with TARP could be spent 
the way he personally directed, thereby declaring Section 102 to be void.   
The loan provided by the federal government would help General Motors avoid 
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going into immediate bankruptcy. The loans required the automakers to greatly 
restructure their overall operations and to show long-term viability. Later on during the 
administration of President Obama in February 2009, the government would assess the 
progress made by the automakers according to the conditions set by the loans.  
If the given conditions were met, then and only then would the federal 
government be liable to provide more aid or to force the firms to repay their loans and 
face bankruptcy. It was decided that the loans provided by the government would have a 
five percent interest rate but this could increase up to ten percent if the automakers 
defaulted on their payments and any concession towards them was not preferred.  
During the Obama Administration, a proposal of so-called “car czar” was widely 
considered but later abandoned mainly because of a proposed second round of lending for 
the automakers. Around mid-February 2009, the automakers Chrysler and General 
Motors did apply for additional funds. President Obama’s task force related to the auto 
industry was created in the same month of February, and it began to hold meetings soon 
after its formation. “Monopoly in any business often leads towards unfair practices.”46 
On February 18, 2009, Chrysler and General Motors again approached the federal 
government regarding having a second loan worth $21.6 billion.47 In this case Chrysler 
would get five billion dollars while the rest of the funds would be allotted to General 
Motors. According to General Motors, it agreed to shed off forty-seven thousand jobs, 
liquidate twelve car models, and close five of its plants as a part of its restructuring 
process.  
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Chrysler agreed to eliminate three thousand jobs, slash an entire shift from the 
production line, and liquidate three of its models. General Motors was also considering 
whether to sell off its Swedish subsidiary known as Saab, but it did not  mentioned any 
plan for what to do with its British subsidiary Vauxhall or  the German subsidiary Opel.  
Chrysler applied for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on April 30, 2009, after its talks with 
its lenders broke down. The next month on May 15, Chrysler announced that it planned 
to shut down twenty-five percent of its entire American dealerships, as related to its 
restructuring process. Only few days after approaching the American federal government 
for help in seeking funding, General Motors published severe losses of around ten billion 
dollars during the final three months of 2008. This brought the entire losses of General 
Motors to more than thirty billion dollars.  
Adding to this data, during 2007 General Motors suffered losses worth thirty-
eight billion dollars. In accordance to its published losses General Motors conceded that 
it desired the auditors to raise concerns about its viability in the future when it intended to 
publish its annual report due in March. All of this was a way of saying that the firm was 
going through a severe crisis in which it did not have many options as to what to do.  
In June 2009, General Motors applied for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,  due to its 
failure in successfully negotiating deals with the bondholders. General Motors became a 
largely nationalized firm on the day on which the application for bankruptcy was made:  
the American government owned sixty percent of it and the Canadian government owned 
some twelve percent.  
The employees owned the remaining stakes in the firm. An application in a New 
York court marked the failure of General Motors as the biggest ever-industrial demise in  
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American history. The firm also announced that it would shut down nine more of its 
plants as well as idling three. Its chief executive made an appeal to the customers to give 
the firm another opportunity, claiming that the General Motors which had let everyone 
down was now gone. “Consumer satisfaction is the key for a firm’s success.”48  
In May 2009, a news article claimed that some seven to eight weeks after 
President Obama’s administration dismissed the CEO of General Motors G. Wagoner Jr. 
he had yet to receive some twenty billion dollars worth of severance package which the 
firm had contractually promised him. In February 2009, an article reported by CNN 
claimed that the bailout process had cost the American taxpayers around $130 billion.   
This news created huge unrest among the general public. Many protested and 
demanded that their money be spent on other, more justified causes. Many critics also 
argued that funding the bailout process was like throwing the money in a bottomless pit 
in which it had no chance of any return on the investment and that the funds could have 
been allotted for better purposes rather than giving it to the failing car giants. This also 
created great problems for the newly elected Obama administration as it feared a drop in 
its approval ratings.  
As of June 2009, according to various sources the Obama and Bush 
administrations had spent more than eighty billion dollars on the automotive industry. In 
May 2011, Chrysler reported that it had repaid the money to the Canadian and American 
treasuries, much earlier than when it was supposed to. 
With the government bailout, US car sales rebounded after 2009.  
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Figure 4-7 U.S. car sales growth 
 
Source: Waverly Advisors 
[The figure above shows the recovery in automobile sales in the US.] 
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4.1.6 Dealing with the fallout 
One of the main things which greatly concerned  the auto manufacturers was their 
public image and how the crisis affected it. In December 2008, General Motors 
introduced a new advertisement in which the firm apologized to the public for violating 
the consumer’s trust as well as disappointing the consumer. They also promised to make 
future commitments to regain focus on the key brands and move away from the usual 
SUV’s and pickups. The firm declared that it needed to make such a statement because it 
was deemed necessary as the mainstream media was continuously providing a grim 
picture regarding GM and their role in the crisis. “Positive public image is essential for 
the success of any business.”49 
According to various news media outlets, the CEO’s of the Big Three who 
attended the Congressional hearing on November 19, 2008, in Washington D.C in order 
to request a bailout for their firms traveled to the destination by the means of their own 
private luxury jets. An article on CNN on November 19 said that many Senators as well 
as  other representatives argued that it was very difficult to provide financial assistance to 
the automakers when their CEOs tend to have such a luxury lifestyle even amid such a 
crisis. 
 For many these careless actions taken by the corporate representatives set a clear 
tone which was becoming immensely unpopular among the rest of the public as well as 
the government itself. The House Speaker issued a statement that until the car 
manufacturers showed a viable and working plan, the House simply could not give them 
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the capital which they desired. The House Speaker also demanded that the automakers 
submit more convincing turnaround plans by early December of 2008.  
Another article which appeared on CNN in November 2008 quoted the president 
of a well known non-profit firm saying that the CEO’s were arriving in Washington in 
order to beg the common taxpayers to help them out, yet it was completely unnecessary 
to make the trip via a flight which cost twenty thousand dollars whereas the same 
distance could have been covered using a mere five hundred dollar travel arrangement. 
Though some critics  argued that it was not known if the original cost for the CEO’s trip 
was actually twenty thousand dollars, but rather  a  estimation, in response to all of these 
criticisms, in December 2008 it was reported that many of the top CEO’s of the leading 
firms had decided to sell off their corporate luxury jet fleets to create a better public 
perception about them.   
For the December 2008 hearing, all three of the CEO’s of the Big Three firms 
choose to drove separately to Washington. For this purpose they chose the latest vehicles 
in hybrid electric technology because of the fierce criticism they had faced when they 
arrived in their personal jets for the previous month’s hearing.   
From the perspective of a common person, the Big Three firms had an extremely 
negative view regarding energy conservation. The sections of the American consumers 
which are greatly concerned regarding ecology have little or no sympathy for the 
background of the big automaker firms. Here the public tends to accuse them of 
profiteering and deliberately destroying the system of mass-transportation as well as the 
privately-owned railways during the decades from the 1920’s to the 1960’s. Many have 
even alleged the Big Three firms contributed towards the development of suburban areas, 
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which are seen as greatly fuel-inefficient in the sense that it requires the common 
commuter to drive into the city from the distant suburbs. In the early 1920’s when 
General Motors faced an extremely saturated car market, it engaged into a controversial 
policy alongside the road-builders which triggered a great shift from a system of mass 
transportation to the personal car. “Big firms tend to have lobbyists to pursue the 
government in their aid.”50 
In December 2008, Fitch Ratings downgraded the Issuer Default Rating for 
General Motors; Chrysler was also downgraded to C, which indicated that its default was 
imminent. An article in the same month from Bloomberg reported that Ford and General 
Motors had their overall debt cut much below the investment status by Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s investor services.  
The debt of General Motors was considered to be extremely insecure and was 
downgraded by one level to C; it was eleven grades below the proper investment quality 
which is set by Standard & Poor’s. Moody’s downgraded its rating of Ford to Caa 
because of twenty-six billion dollars of Ford debt, nine below the proper investment 
quality.  
The Big Three firms spent some fifty million dollars on lobbying Congress in 
2008’s first nine months alone. Over his thirty years in Congress, Senator Carl Levin 
received almost half a million dollars. House member John Dingell received almost one 
million dollars over his fifty-four years in Congress. House member Joe Knollenberg 
received about nine hundred thousand dollars over sixteen years in office. Dingell’s wife 
Debbie worked as a leading lobbyist for General Motors; she also became a senior 
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executive at General Motors with an undisclosed salary. Until May 2008, stock owned by 
the Dingells in General Motors was estimated at around three hundred and fifty thousand, 
alongside stock options of around one million and a pension fund. The value of this 
stock, pension and options was lost because of the bankruptcy restructuring which 
Congress approved for General Motors. 
General Motors sent many letters to its vast number of supplier executives, 
dealers, union members, and employees, asking each and ever
Congress and inform them about the many points which might show up as potential side 
effects of the bankruptcy which it might face. In June of 2009, a bill was introduced 
which argued that the government should distribute the stock
Motors to each and every individual taxpayer, however it failed to pass. 
Figure 4-8 Planned GM dealership reduction pre
[The above figure describes the dealership reductions made by General Motor’s pre
post-bankruptcy.] 
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4.1.7 Reform proposals 
After much criticism, the Big Three’s CEO’s went to Washington D.C for the 
December 2 Congressional hearing on hybrid cars. This was i a part of their new national 
strategy involving a turnaround procedure which would help them win back the 
confidence of the general public. Their initial plan was to commit more towards electric 
vehicle and fuel-saving technologies and then to present long-term viable plans assuring 
their dedication towards solving the crisis in front of the Congressional committee.  
Ford unveiled its aggressive plan which involved the electrifying of its vehicles. 
This included plans to introduce a van-type vehicle which would be completely electrical. 
This would be complemented by a battery powered sedan launched in 2011. By 2012, 
Ford also intended to bring a wide variety of plug-in hybrids, regular hybrids, and battery 
electric vehicles into the market. These vehicles also tend to be relatively cheaper so 
more and more consumers can buy them. 
Ford wanted to invest about fourteen billion dollars in fuel-efficient technologies 
during the course of the next several years and therefore aimed to achieve a target of 
thirty-six percent improvement in fuel related economy for its entire fleet by 2015, which 
it  set as a target year. “Fuel efficiency in automobiles is one of the key things the 
consumer takes interest in while buying.”51  
Ford also intended to pursue many other programs through which it intended to 
use to develop various technologies; for these purposes it allotted five billion dollars. At 
the same time, Ford sought up to nine billion dollars in bridge loans.  
GM was also involved in a greatly publicized effort to launch its own hybrid 
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model plug-in vehicles, unveiling its production version of the Chevy Volt. This vehicle 
has the capability to travel up to forty miles in its electric mode. GM also intended to 
employ the drive train of the Volt in its other vehicles. GM laid out many different plans 
for launching a fleet of predominately fuel-efficient cars as well as crossovers over the 
next three to four years. This would involve investing some three billion dollars in 
technologies related to fuel-efficiency as well as alternative fuels. “Strategies should be 
planned by keeping in mind the current trends in the environment.”52  
It planned to offer fifteen varieties of hybrid vehicles by the year 2012, when 
about half of its entire fleet would be composed of flex-fuel vehicles able to run on 
ethanol-rich E85 or gasoline.  
GM sought twelve billion dollars in terms of bridge loans throughout 2009. It also 
asked for a credit of six billion dollars, which it could draw on in case the forecasted sales 
fell short. It ended the third quarter of 2008 with reserves of cash of about sixteen billion 
dollars, and according to its estimates in July 2008 it needed a minimum of eleven to 
fourteen billion dollars on hand in order to maintain its overall operations. Without any 
federal loans, the firm expected its reserves to fall to the level of ten billion dollars by the 
end of year and to three and a half billion dollars by February of the next year. 
Chrysler predicted that for its 2009 model year, some seventy-three percent of its 
total vehicles would be better in terms of fuel efficiency as compared to their 2008 
models. The company also intended to launch many new smaller and fuel-efficient cars in 
the future. Its plan also included the introduction of a hybrid Dodge Ram by 2010 
alongside its first ever electric-drive vehicle. Chrysler also had further plans of launching 
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an additional three electric-drive vehicles by the year 2013.  
Just like General Motors, Chrysler also planned to make half of its fleet  flex-fuel 
capable by 2012. For this the company sought a bridge loan worth seven billion dollars. It 
ended the first six months of 2008 with around ten billion dollars but was likely to end 
the year having only two and a half billion dollars remaining in cash. Here, one major 
concern was that it might not make it in the first quarter of 2009 without the loan.   
The automakers – especially the Big Three – submitted applications regarding the 
retooling of loans worth twenty billion dollars. These loans were needed in order for them 
to pay for their various projects which would address fuel efficiency and carbon 
emissions. “Firms should invest towards the environment in which they operate, such as 
towards less carbon emission or better infrastructure of the surrounding areas if 
required.”53  
Then, in December 2008, General Motors made an announcement regarding the 
temporary closure of its twenty factories in United States. Soon after this announcement, 
Chrysler announced that it would also temporarily close thirty of its plants for a period of 
one month.  
General Motors also had plans to consolidate its portfolio regarding its American 
business by concentrating on the Buick, Cadillac, GMC, and Chevrolet brands while 
possibly selling or phasing out the Hummer, Pontiac, and Saturn brands. In June 2009, 
GM  announced that it had sold the Hummer brand to a Chinese firm and that the 
complete transaction would close in 2009’s third quarter.  Yet a February 2009 article 
written in the Herald Tribune claimed that General Motors was about to invest one billion 
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dollars in Brazil; it also claimed that the money for this investment came from the bailout 
funds which it had received from the American government.  
Although this process of selling off brands to other firms was seen as improper 
practice by many observers, the fact is that the top car manufacturers had little to no 
choice regarding this matter. Critics argued that by this procedure the firms would not 
only lose a great share of their market value but would also create a negative perspective 
in the eyes of the common consumer which would see this as U.S. jobs being shifted 
overseas.  
4.2 Crisis in Canada 
The auto industry in Canada is closely linked to its American counterpart mainly 
because of the agreement known as Automotive Products Trade, which later evolved into 
NAFTA (Northern American Free Trade Agreement). Canada has a total of 3,500 car 
dealers which provide employment to a total of 140,000 people. Over 22,000 jobs were 
lost from 2007 to 2009. Therefore, these dealers informed the federal government in 
Ottawa in November of 2008 that they were at a huge risk from the global financial 
crisis. Therefore they asked the government to provide help despite the fact that they 
recorded huge number of sales that year.  
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Figure 4-9 Canadian Auto Employment 
 
Data sources: Statistics Canada/Chart: Reed Construction Data – CanaData 
 
Ottawa considered providing financial aid to the Big Three’s Canadian 
subsidiaries as well as to the auto part companies. The auto industry scenario argued that 
the guarantees of loans alongside other help would go on to rescue tens of thousands of 
auto sector jobs in Canada, which faced a great threat from the huge drop in car sales in 
the United States market.  
Chrysler Canada specifically asked for a billion dollars in aid, making it the only 
one among the Big Three’s Canadian arms to ask for a specific dollar request. Many 
industry analysts criticized the labor contracts and the dealings which then-president of 
the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) Buzz Hargrove had with the Big Three in 2007. 
There were predictions concerning the subprime mortgage crisis and worries that 
resulting currency issues would impact the Canadian auto production units very hard.  
It was also noted that the president of UAW in America agreed to have “all-in” 
wages for UAW, this caused the pension and benefit costs to experience a significant drop 
from the high of $75.86 per hour rate in 2007 to about $51 per hour average rate in 2010. 
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Comparing this to the cost per hour rate of CAW, it can be sees that it was $77 in 2007, 
which rose to more than $80 per hour at the terminating period of the new contract. 
According to analysts, the UAW president went into negotiations with one primary 
objective and that was to save jobs, whereas the strategy of CAW was to get every single 
dime out of them. “Worker unions should always look after the profit of the firm and the 
entire union instead of just few individuals.”54 
The current union president in Canada, Ken Lewenza, urged at the time that the 
labor union not be held responsible for the bankruptcy problems faced by the Big Three 
automakers; he further said that his own members would never make any concessions 
despite that being a part of the proposed terms of a bailout funded by the taxpayers. 
Lewenza  also added that he would not accept any more cuts after having already lost 
many thousands of jobs in previous few years. “Job cuts are often feared by the 
management since it can result in any form of backlash from the worker unions.”55 
Lawenza also said that back in 2007, CAW had agreed to make proper concessions, 
which would help the Big Three firms save some nine hundred million dollars over the 
next three years.  
 The Canadian Taxpayers Federation’s (CTF) spokesperson sharply criticized the 
“no-concession” stance of the CAW, saying that this would only strengthen the 
opposition towards a taxpayer-funded bailout for the Big Three automakers. CTF further 
noted that it was very difficult to understand why any person who asked the government 
for help would at the same time not want to do anything to contribute towards a solution 
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to the crisis event. CTF also stated that the union had failed to properly realize that they 
had lived comfortably because of the already substantial largesse offered by the Canadian 
taxpayers for many decades. Columnist Kelly McParland suggested that if he didn’t 
provide anything then his members – including himself – were more likely to lose 
everything. Kelly also stated that the main problem facing the United States auto industry 
should be borne equally by labor and management alike. He went on to criticize labor for 
building up completely unsustainable benefits and pay for themselves at the same time 
attacking management for their short-term strategy and sales tactics.  
The proposed bailout of $3.5 Canadian billion for the Big Three’s Canadian 
subsidiaries was opposed by the CTF, which suggested that it would result in a great 
financial burden for the average Canadian taxpayer, and also would help provide an 
excuse for the American automakers to postpone making any large changes no matter 
how desired those changes might be outside the auto industry. 
 CTF noted that the provincial and federal governments spent about seven 
hundred and eighty-two million dollars on the Big Three in the previous five years, 
comparing that kind of spending to the cash having been thrown into a bottomless pit that 
kept on requesting more and more money. Lewenza disagreed with this by saying that 
Canadians should see the bailout as a loan, which would be paid back after the economic 
crisis was over when the nation’s economy was back on a prosperous track.  
In December 2008, the province of Ontario as well as the government of Canada 
offered more than three billion dollars in loans to the automotive industry. According to 
this plan, General Motors would receive three billion and the rest would be allotted to 
Chrysler. (Ford was not participating in the bailout process and it only requested a line of 
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credit.)  
A cost-cutting deal with GM Canada was negotiated by CAW in March 2009 
wherein its current contract was extended by one more year until September 2012. The 
deal also allowed for the preservation of the base pay of the average assembly worker at 
almost thirty-four dollars an hour. It required eliminating the seventeen hundred dollars in 
special bonuses given annually and reduced the overall paid absences to one week for a 
year.  
The vacation entitlements would be kept as they were, ranging up to six weeks a 
year for any high seniority worker. Senior autoworkers from CAW were allowed to keep 
ten weeks of their vacation alongside full pay. This was combined with not having to 
provide any contribution to their own pension fund and relying on the taxpayers in order 
to help making up for their unfunded liabilities . This deal also introduced payments by 
the members towards a health benefits plan which included fifteen dollars per month for 
pensioners and thirty dollars a month for the family of current workers. Lewenza claimed 
that this would also trim by thirty five percent of the firm’s contributions towards the 
programs provided by unions like wellness and child care programs. The agreement was 
deemed contingent on the Canadian government as it involved allocating some twenty 
percent from General Motors of United States as well as getting many billions of U.S 
dollars in provincial and federal taxpayer support, primarily in the form of loans.   
Lewenza claimed that the package as a whole was a major sacrifice, however 
independent observers assessed it somewhat differently. From their perspective the deal 
did not go far enough, and an analyst from Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) 
defined it as “not material.” Another prominent automotive firm consultant claimed that 
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General Motors had lost a great opportunity to cut labor costs. He noted that since 
bankruptcy was an ongoing threat Queen’s Park (the Ontario Legislature) and Ottawa 
should have demanded cuts in the labor bill as a condition for the bailout, and that a 
deficit towards the pension fund would prevent CAW from striking. There were also 
estimates that the average hourly cost of any General Motors Canada worker was seventy 
five to eighty dollars including the benefits, such that General Motors got away with 
seven or six when it could have cut wages by twenty dollars. “Cuts in wages by the firm 
should be properly consulted with the workers union before being applied.”56 
 Further opinions stated that giving up the increases in cost-of-living were not 
prominent sacrifices as inflation was considered to be nearly non-existent, so that a forty 
hour decrease in paid time just translated into “five fewer spa days.” A professor from the 
University of Toronto calculated that this process would save some one hundred and fifty 
million dollars on an annual basis, even as General Motors was seeking six billion dollars 
from the government of Canada in support. 
In addition, many critics argued that this process would not be a final process in 
itself regarding requests from the automakers for a bailout. It was also estimated that 
General Motors would go through the loans provided by the government in the next few 
quarters, long before any recovery was expected in the market. Even the president of 
General Motors Canada admitted that the company had already pledged its entire assets 
to the United States government, in order to help secure the first tranche of some thirty 
billion US dollars in loans, thereby leaving no other assets to collateralize the six billion 
dollar loan from the government of Canada.  
The Federation of Canadian Taxpayers noted that somewhere between 1982 and 
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2005, about eighteen billion dollars was handed out by Ottawa to different companies, 
with only seven billion dollars ultimately repayable and only about one and a half billion 
dollars ever repaid. “Taxpayers should have the knowledge about where their money is 
being spent.”57 
The president of Chrysler, Thomas LaSorda, and the chief manufacturer of Ford, 
Joe Hinrichs, noted that the deal between General Motors and CAW was insufficient; 
they suggested that they preferred breaking the negotiating pattern of CAW, which was 
set by General Motors. Chrysler’s president told the Finance Committee of the Canadian 
House of Commons that he would recommend a twenty-dollar hourly wage cut, 
suggesting that his firm might even withdraw from the Canadian market if it failed to 
achieve more viable cost savings from CAW.  
The CEO of Fiat, Sergio Marchionne, had asked that the wages of CAW workers 
should be reduced to the non-unionized workers’ levels of Toyota and Honda, which were 
operating in Canada, or else they would prefer walking away from a proposed alliance 
alongside Chrysler. This would result in Chrysler being forced into bankruptcy. “Mergers 
in corporations often tend to bring a better product.”58 
In March of 2009, both the provincial Ontario and federal Canadian governments 
jointly rejected the restructuring plans submitted by Chrysler and General Motors. This 
occurred after the day when American President Obama also rejected the plans offered by 
their parent firms. The Ontario Premier as well as the federal Industry Minister in Canada 
suggested that the initial deal by CAW was insufficient for cutting costs, therefore the 
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union had no choice but to return to negotiations in order to make further concessions just 
to show that the taxpayers’ money of would be used in a justifiable manner.
Figure 4
Source: statistics Canada
-10 Canadian Automobileautomotive Output
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5. Crisis in the European Markets 
The automotive industry is the “engine” of the European economy: about one in 
ten jobs in Europe depend directly or indirectly on the automotive sector. The industry is 
the largest investor in innovation and R&D and a formidable export force. The European 
automotive industry generates a turnover of 551 billion Euro, which represents around 
6.5% of Europe’s gross domestic product (GDP). The industry directly and indirectly 
provides jobs to over 12 million families. The multiplier effect of the 2.2 million direct 
employees at vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers is enormous. One job at the 
vehicle manufacturer creates four more at suppliers and another five in related sectors 
and retail.  
The economic recession and financial crisis have had a devastating effect on the 
automotive industry with serious implications for the wider economy. For more than a 
decade, sales in the EU have stayed within a relatively narrow trading range (16.7m to 
17.7m units). Since the summer of 2008, sales decisively dropped through the floor of 
this range and crashed further in the final quarter of the year. 
By 2009, vehicle sales were running 3.5 million units lower than the trend rate. 
This shock, combined with a synchronized crash in key automotive export markets, 
brought to reality a beyond worse case scenario, exceeding the pre-crisis planning of even 
the most cautious manufacturers. The crash in domestic vehicle sales and in key export 
markets was so sharp and so deep that every single manufacturer saw significant cash 
burn, estimated at between 18 billion euro and 30 billion euro.  
Although the slump in the European market began even before the start of this 
 63
crisis, the events of 2008 exaggerated the losses which were felt heavily even by those 
sectors related to manufacturing.  
Figure 5-1 Passenger car production in Europe 1990 – 2010 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Commercial Vehicle Production in Europe 1990-2010 
 
Source: ACEA 
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Figure 5-3 New passenger car registration and GDP growth in the EU 1990 - 2009 
 
[The above figure shows a sharp decline in the new passenger car registrations as part of 
the GDP growth in the European Union, and e how these two trends are closely 
interlinked with each other.] 
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Figure 5-4 New commercial vehicle registration and GDP growth in the EU 1997 - 
2009 
 
[The above figure shows the relationship between the sharp declines in both the European 
Union Gross Domestic Figures and registrations for new commercial vehicles in the 
European Union.] 
 
5.1 Crisis in Russia 
The automotive industry in Russia was
crisis especially with regards to the automobile crisis which followed afterwards. This 
impact was most severely felt in the production of passenger cars which saw a significant 
drop from about 1.5 million units in
production of Lorry fell to ninety
same period.  
Figure 5-5 New Light Vehicle Sales in Russian, Thousand of Units
The federal government in Russ
five billion dollars to improve the overall situation in the auto industry. These funds 
included about two billion dollars worth of bailout money for the most troubled firms as 
well as three billion dollars wort
Minister Putin noted that this
 impacted greatly by the global financial 
 2008 to only six hundred thousand units in 2009. The 
-one thousand from about quarter of a million during the 
ia introduced some protection measures worth 
h of credit for the buyers of Russian automobiles. Prime 
 move was essential for saving Russian jobs. 
66
 
 
 
 67
Tariffs were increased on foreign trucks and cars by a minimum of a hundred 
percent and fifty percent, respectively. These tariffs were associated with the size of the 
engine in the vehicles. The increment in duties led to many protests in Russia, especially 
in the city of Vladivostok where the import of Japanese vehicles was a key sector of the 
overall economy of the city.  
To compensate for these losses suffered by the businesses in Vladivostok, the 
Prime Minister ordered the auto-manufacturing company Sollers to shift one of its plants 
to the city from Moscow.  This process was finished in 2009 and the new plant now 
provides employment to about seven hundred locals. Furthermore, it was planned that 
this plant would produce more than thirteen thousand vehicles in the city of Vladivostok 
by the year 2010.   
Due to the efforts of the government during the crisis, automotive production 
returned to its pre-crisis levels at the end of 2010. Also, some ninety percent of the entire 
vehicle models being sold in Russia were produced domestically by 2010; the 
manufacturer which topped the list in production was Avtovaz. According to statistics, the 
first seven months of 2010 saw increment in the sale of Lada cars by sixty percent, and 
KIA also reported an increase of more than hundred percent in sales while Chevrolet also 
posted a rise of fifteen percent in its sales.  
By 2010, Russia was regarded as the fifteenth largest car producer in the world, 
ahead of Poland and Italy. The entire automotive industry in Russia accounts for some 
seven percent of the global car production. For example, manufacturers of E-mobile, 
regarded as giants in Russian car manufacturing, announced that they would be selling 
the vehicle in three distinctive body types, a hatchback, delivery truck and a sedan.  
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The firm also announced that most of its vehicle’s components would be produced 
in either former Soviet countries or in Russia. The serial production was due to start in 
2012 with the intention of selling about ten thousand units during its first year in 
production. The price would range between ten thousand to fifteen thousand dollars to 
keep it affordable for the middle class in Russia.  
Furthermore, the firm producing E-mobile also intended to sell its product beyond 
the borders of Russia. One of the biggest hurdles in front of it is the need to come to 
terms with the European Union’s regulation policies.    
5.1.1 Industry overview 
 
The automotive industry in Russia can be divided into four broad categories, 
which are foreign OEMs, local brand producers, local firms producing foreign brands, 
and joint ventures. In 2008, there were about fifty-five hundred firms manufacturing 
vehicles and their related equipment in Russia, this amounted to a total of 1.5 billion 
Rubles in sales production.59  
The most popular cars in Russia are commonly the homegrown brands such as the 
models of AvtoVAZ. When looking at the total units sold in the year 2009, the Lada 
Priora topped the chart with more than eighty thousand units sold. Second was the Lada 
Samara with about seventy-eight thousand units sold. Third was the Lada 2105/2107 with 
about fifty-seven thousand units sold. The Lada 2105 was thought to see more increase in 
its sales due to the car scrappage scheme launched in March 2010, where consumers were 
encouraged to trade in their old, poorly-performing vehicles. The fourth best selling car in 
2009 in Russia was the Lada Kalina, which sold about fifty-two thousand units.  
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In recent times, the commercial vehicle sector has seen a surge in popularity in the 
GAZelle van, which is manufactured by GAZ. This has occupied a total share of about 
fifty percent of the market in 2009 by selling more than forty-two thousand units. Many 
leading analysts, critics, and journals declared GAZelle to be the most successful 
automobile in Russia in 2009.  
There have been several new projects being launched by the Russian automobile 
industry in recent years, some of them very ambitious. The Marussia brand, which is 
manufactured by Marussia Motors, recently became the first supercar as well as the first 
modern sports car produced in Russia.  
The Marussia B1 was introduced in December 2008 at Moscow’s New Manezh 
Hall. In September 2010, the first Marussia Motors showroom was opened in Moscow; 
Nikolay Fomenko, a well-known actor, racer and singer in Russia, heads Marussia. In 
2010, the firm gained a significant amount of stake in Formula One’s Virgin Racing team; 
this led to the team renaming itself to Marussia Virgin Racing. This also made it the first 
Russian Formula One team. 
Russian automobile manufacturers also have other ambitious projects such as the 
Yo-mobile which is a vehicle that can burn natural gas as well as gasoline. This vehicle 
was introduced in Moscow in December 2010 and was a joint venture between the 
Onexim investment group and Yarovit, which is a St. Petersburg based manufacturer of 
trucks. The project was lead by Mikhail Prokhorov who also was a key financier of this 
entire project. He planned to invest about two hundred million dollars in this venture. His 
main aim was to counter a common stereotype that good cars cannot be produced in 
Russia. 
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5.1.2 Key actors 
 
The largest automobile firm in Russia is Avtovaz. It is located in Tolyatti; it has a 
current employee workforce of about one hundred and thirty thousand personnel. It is 
famous for its Lada models, which dominate sales in the Russian market. Some fifty 
percent of the total car production in Russia is accounted for by Avtovaz.  
The second biggest car manufacturer in Russia is Avtotor, which is located at 
Kaliningrad Oblast. This firm performs many different operations on foreign models such 
as CKD, SKS or full-cycle assembly.  
This includes performing operations on Kia, BMW, Chevrolet, and Cadillac 
vehicles. In 2009, a total of sixty thousand cars were produced by Avtotor, which 
accounted for ten percent of the entire Russian car production.  
 The third largest car manufacturer is Avtoframos, which produced about fifty 
thousand cars in 2009. Its manufacturing plant is located in southeast Moscow. It is a 
joint venture involving Moscow city administration and France’s Renault, with Renault 
holding the majority stake. This firm manufactures the Renault Sandero and Renault 
Logan brands. Its ratio regarding Russian-made equipment is fifty-four percent, and this 
is expected to increase to seventy-four percent by 2012. The fourth largest carmaker in 
Russia is Volkswagen and the fifth is Ford. Summing up the total share of the five biggest 
auto manufacturers, they account for eighty percent of the entire cars which are made in 
Russia.  
Focusing on the heavy vehicle sector, the biggest firm is the KaMAZ truck maker.  
It is also regarded as one of the biggest firms in the entire Russian automotive industry. 
KaMAZ sold about thirty-three thousand vehicles in 2010, of which some twenty-eight 
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thousand were sold in Russia and the rest to foreign countries.  
Another huge firm in the heavy vehicle sector is GAZ; it makes busses, trucks, 
and vans among other items. Its most renowned product is the GAZelle van; this has a 
total share of forty-nine percent of the light commercial vehicle market. This firm 
launched a better version in the year 2009 named GAZelle Business. GAZ occupied a 
total market share of seventy-seven percent in the bus sector; it sold slightly more than 
six thousand small class busses, eighteen hundred medium class and eleven hundred and 
fifty-six large class.  
Concern Tractor Plants is Russia’s biggest tractor maker and also one of the 
biggest machine-building firms in the world. It is located at Cheboksary. This firm 
employs about forty-five thousand personnel.  
5.1.3 Social impact of potential bankruptcy   
 
The automotive industry in Russia is a very important sector of the economy; it 
employs six hundred thousand personnel as well as supporting two to three million 
individuals in related industries. Politically, it has a huge significance on the nation’s 
economy. This is due to many factors, firstly because it employs such a huge number of 
individuals and secondly because many people in Russia are dependent on social services 
which are given by the automotive firms.  
Example here includes the AvotVAZ factory located in Tolyatti which is very 
important to the entire city. Tolyatti is regarded as a “monotown,” a city that is entirely 
dependent on a single firm for its economy. TheAvotVAZ factory provides employment 
to around a hundred thousand people in a city where the entire population is around seven 
hundred thousand.  
 72
President Dmitry Medvedev inaugurated a program known as the Medvedev 
modernization in 2009. This was aimed at diversifying Russia’s raw materials  
throughout its energy-dominated economy,  with the main purpose to turn the economy 
towards modern high-technology based on innovation. After this, the automotive industry 
in Russia came under a great spotlight because of its enormous potential for 
modernization.  
Prime Minister Putin has taken a personal interest in the automotive industry. He 
has also made many attempts to give great publicity to the local car manufacturers, such 
as participating in the road trip at new Amur Highway during August 2010. 
5.2 Crisis in Germany 
The automotive industry in Germany was strongly knocked about by the financial 
and economic crisis. After October 2008, production levels declined rapidly. Compared 
with 2009, passenger cars declined 31% and commercial vehicles decreased 59%.   
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Figure 5-6 German passengers car sales, monthly progress year-to-date (thousand 
units) 
 
        
Source: Selective Rationality 
The automotive industry in Germany emerged very quickly from the 2008 crisis 
mainly due to the rapid rise of exports. The U.S. and China were the main drivers of 
those exports. The automotive industry was seen to increase its domestic production as 
well as its exports by the end of 2010. “Increasing exports should be one of the main 
priorities of the government.”60 
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Many critics, analysts and observers compared the auto crisis as well as the entire 
financial crisis as the worst problem Germany had faced since World War II.  Many of the 
automobile giants predicted sharp cuts in their production of vehicles, for example the 
CEO of Daimler predicted that its firm would produce 150,000 fewer cars in 2009. BMW 
reported having to cut some 8,000 jobs only a few months after the start of the crisis. 
Many firms were also fighting for their survival such as Opel, a subsidiary of General 
Motors. The German wings of Chrysler and Ford also faced similar situations mainly 
because of severe mismanagement at the top level.  
Take Daimler as an example. In the period from January to March 2009, Daimler 
reported losses of 1.4 billion Euros. Daimler’s responses to the losses included reducing 
production at several of its plants, reducing work time and cutting 8.75% of salaries for 
60,000 employees, with no bonuses in 2008 for 141,000 employees. To dampen its 
financial problems, Daimler inquired about 2 billion Euros from Abu Dhabi strategic 
investment fund to exchange for 9% of its share. 
Although the problems were enormous, the German auto industry came out of 
them. The main reason for this was foreign demand for its vehicles, as the industry places 
massive dependence on exports. By 2010, it had succeeded in increasing the exports of its 
automobiles by a fifth as compared to previous best-recorded figures, to more than 4.5 
million. “Exports are essential for the revival of industries.”61 Domestically, in 2009 the 
German Government introduced a scrappage program, which like the Russian progam, 
offered consumers 2,500 euros ($3,400) to surrender their old clunkers. It turned out very 
effective and helped spur more than 1.3 million new car sales. 
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5.3 Crisis in France 
The economic crisis in France put those firms which were already in difficulty 
into an even more desperate situation. Even those companies previously considered to be 
in a relatively good position found themselves in very fragile shape in 2008.  Sales of 
new vehicles stagnated at 2 million. The new car purchasing power of households 
declined significantly.  
Figure 5-7 French auto production compared to EU 
 
[Here is a very interesting chart written in French, which shows the comparison of French 
auto production with EU production in total in recent years.] 
In November 2008, the French manufacturer PSA Peugeot Citroen cited that its 
total sales might fall by some 10% in 2009; this was following a 17% drop in its last 
quarter sales in 2008. Because of this it planned to cut jobs in various sectors by about 
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2,500. In February of 2009, PSA made a new announcement that now it would cut 11,000 
jobs throughout the world, however it cited that France would be excepted from these 
cuts.  
During the 2008 financial year, Renault announced a total profit of about 600 
million Euros; this was a significant drop of about 80% from the previous year. Renault’s 
sales throughout the world fell by 7% except in Europe, and in the European market it 
fell by 4%; this caused it to abandon its previous growth targets for 2009. Although the 
situation was grim in the markets, still Renault was one of the few European car 
manufacturers to have returned to profit levels soon after the crisis.   
The shrinking car market in France is not a new phenomenon. The reduction of 
demand had already begun before the crisis. The current crisis did help to reveal how 
unsustainable the industry was. At the end of 2008, the French government took some 
immediate measures to combat the crisis. The government spent 6 billion Euros, divided 
between both PSA and Renault, to support them in “green” car production. The 
government also created a fund to modernize auto suppliers since they were equally 
weakened by the crisis. The manufacturers’ financial corporations also benefited from 
subsidies from the state, allowing them to continue to finance their clients. The state also 
created its own strategic investment fund to invest in firms which were threatened by 
bankruptcy or acquisition. Also, a scrappage scheme offered 1,000 Euros for vehicles 
over ten years of age that were traded in for a new “clean” car. All these measures helped 
French automotive manufacturers weather the crisis relatively well.  
The 2008 economic crisis revealed problems in the French automobile industry 
but it also had some positive outcomes. One was the reversal of the trend from “over-
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quality” to meet buyers’ needs. Another was improving the “social” quality of their 
products, to produce smaller, safer and more environmental friendly vehicles. 
5.4 Crisis in Italy 
In December 2008, Fiat announced that it intended to extend the length of its 
plant closures by a month in Italy, where the main plant for the Alfa Romeo cars was 
already due to be shut for about four weeks. Fiat also announced in January 2009 that it 
faced a nineteen percent drop in its last three month’s revenues of 2008. This issue was so 
important to the government that the Italian Prime Minister ordered that he would take 
note of this issue with the highest priority. However in February 2009, because of the 
actions taken by the Italian government for the stimulation of automotive sector, Fiat 
announced that the closure of its plants would be curtailed. It also announced that it 
expected a drop of about 14% in its European sales by 2009. In January 2009, the firm 
announced an agreement according to which it was subjected to regulatory approval in 
order to acquire 35% of Chrysler. This stake by Fiat in Chrysler did not involve any 
conventional sale of shares; rather it would be done by allowing Chrysler to properly 
utilize Fiat’s fuel-efficient technology.  
Chrysler was also given access to the European sales outlets of Fiat, while at the 
same time Fiat gained access to the U.S dealerships of Chrysler where it was predicted 
that smaller car models like the Fiat Punto would be very successful. Fiat had faced many 
troubles in gaining a proper foothold at the U.S markets whereas Chrysler could never 
occupy a strong share in the European market.  
5.5 Crisis in Spain 
Spain today is the eighth largest producer of automobiles. The automotive 
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industry is 3.5% of its GDP. In 2008, when passenger car sales fell 28% it marked a 
turning point in the recent history of the Spanish automobile industry. In the second half 
of 2009 and the first half of 2010, there was an increase in registries and the recovery of 
profits, thanks to the government’s direct financial support of the purchase of vehicles. 
SEAT, a well-known Spanish automobile manufacturer, announced in October 
2008 it was slashing production on its Martorell manufacturing plant by 5% mainly 
because of a significant fall in its sales. This decision affected about 700 of its employees. 
On other fronts, SEAT was dedicated to investing in many new technologies which could 
help reduce the cost of its business operations. These steps included installing solar 
panels at its plant near Barcelona.  
The development of electric vehicles presented a major industrial, energetic, and 
environmental opportunity for Spain. The development of biofuel vehicles has also been 
a promising industrial opportunity. The auto companies have also sought the chance to 
enter markets like China and India. As a result of these and other measure, when 
compared to many of the other European economies, which suffered great losses due to 
the automobile crisis, the Spanish manufacturers conceded fewer losses on all fronts.62 
5.6 Crisis in the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the Jaguar Land Rover group, which was owned by Tata 
Motors sought $1.5 billion in loans from the government so that it could cope  properly 
with the crisis. On December 2008, Tata declared that they intended to inject many tens 
of millions of dollars into the firm, which they had bought from Ford in early 2008. Then 
Prime Minister Brown stated that he intended to take a more positive role in solving the 
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problems faced by the car industries throughout the U.K.   
Nissan announced in January 2009 that it was to cut twelve hundred jobs from its 
factory located in the northeast of England, namely Washington, Tyne, and Wear, because 
of the global automotive crisis of 2008. Despite being declared as the most productive 
and efficient car manufacturing plant in Europe, the firm did not hesitate to make this 
announcement.  
The British subsidiary of General Motors, Vauxhall Motors, widely regarded as 
among the top most-favored brands in the U.K, has a total of two bases in Britain. These 
include a factory located at Cheshire and R&D center alongside its headquarters at Luton, 
Bedfordshire. There is no proper data available to confirm if the cutbacks made by 
General Motors had any effect on these plants. This group, alongside its sister subsidiary, 
the Opel brand in Germany, was to be sold to Magna International in their majority. 
Magna is an Austro-Canadian firm which supplies car equipment to large automakers; 
however, this transaction was later cancelled by General Motors.  
Optare, which is a British bus manufacturer, got an order in November 2008 from 
Arriva for the creation of more than fifty buses. This contract was estimated to be worth 
more than six million pounds and required the creation of five hundred jobs in the 
Assembly factory of the firm located at Leeds, West Yorkshire, as well as at the parts 
center located at North Lanarkshire. British commercial vehicle and van manufacturer 
LDV Group requested thirty million pounds in bridging loans from the British 
government in order to proceed with a management buyout; this was later on refused. 
LDV had stated that it possessed a bright future and wanted to become the producer of 
electric vans if any management buyout were to take place. LDV’s production at its 
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Birmingham factory was suspended after 2008 because of poor demands. Later on when 
no buyout materialized, LDV folded in October 2009.  
Like other countries, the UK government launched a scrappage incentive scheme 
in order to support its auto industry. Cars registered before February 29, 2000, were 
eligible to be scrapped for a discount of £2000 on a new car, half of which was provided 
by the government and the other half by the dealer. This led to 300,000 new car 
purchases. In 2010, the government announced a £230 million  “plug-in car” grant 
scheme to provide a £5,000 grant towards the purchase of plug-in electric cars. An 
additional “Plugged-In-Place” scheme would provide some 11,000 charging points in 
selected cities over the next three years.  
Figure 5-8 British Car Production is Accelerating 
 
              Source: SMMT 
 
5.7 Measures to cope with the crisis
The European passenger car and commercial vehicle markets were hit hard by the 
financial crisis and subsequent economic downtu
difficult for the sector to finance daily operations andalso weakened demand for new cars 
and trucks.  
The current crisis is thus threefold:
Financially, it has a drastically limited access to credit, and led to high cost
credits when available for the manufacturers, their suppliers, and for potential buyers of 
cars and trucks. 
Economically, it has led to a dramatic drop in demand for both passenger cars and 
commercial vehicles. 
Structurally, it has lowered margins due to an increasingly complex and diverse 
 
Figure 5-9 UK Car Sales 2000-2011 
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product portfolio and an increasingly pressing demand to adapt manufacturing, logistics, 
vehicle and R&D to meet environmental needs. 
5.7.1 Measures taken by the EU governments and institutions 
 
It is most essential that EU governments and institutions ensure access to 
liquidity, through the European Investment Bank and in other ways. 
It is equally vital that governments stimulate demand for new vehicles with fleet 
renewal schemes; this will benefit both the economy and the environment. 
Fleet renewal schemes can take the form of scrapping incentives and other forms 
of market stimulus, for example through fiscal measures. Governments can collect 381 
billion Euros in vehicle taxes and have a powerful instrument to influence the market. 
The EU should also refrain from adding any new costly vehicle regulations for a 
few years. 
5.7.2 Measures taken by automotive manufacturers 
 
Production: manufacturers need to adapt their output to deal with the anticipated 
decrease in demand of vehicles 
Employment: manufacturers should adjust their employment base in an as socially 
responsible way possible, using the flexibility agreements at their disposal (extended 
vacations, taking weeks out of production, shortening working weeks, non-renewal of 
short-term contracts, and non-filling in of vacancies), and in close contact with unions 
and governments. 
Cost: manufacturers should cut all discretionary costs by limiting travel and 
meetings, downsizing advertising, and sponsorships. 
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Investment and R&D: make sure manufacturers review their expenditures on new 
product programs and R&D. 
Marketing and sales: manufacturers need to adjust their products and marketing to 
meet the new demands of their customers. 
Support of suppliers: manufacturers need to scrutinize the situation of their key 
suppliers on a daily basis and provide support to the extent they can. 
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6. Crisis in the Asian Markets 
When talking about Asian markets, the markets first need to be separated into two 
categories. The first category is that of an emerging market represented by China and 
India. The second category is a developed automobile market which represents Japan and 
South Korea. 
6.1 Crisis in China 
China today is one of the most important automobile markets in Asia. Since 2008, 
China’s auto industry has become the world’s largest. The automobile industry in China 
is comprised of 120 vehicle manufacturers employing nearly two million workers. Of the 
automobiles produced, 44.3% were local brands (including BYD, Lifan, Chang’an, 
Geely, Chery, Hafei, Jianghuai, Great Wall, and Roewe.) Most of the cars manufactured 
in China are sold within China since China’s home market provides its automakers a solid 
base. 
Regarding the global auto industry crisis of 2008, the Chinese auto industry was 
also affected. The yields of Chinese automobile were 9.3 million, an increased of 5.2% in 
2008 compared with 2007, but the growth speed decreased by 16.8%. The total 
automobile sales volumes reached nearly 9.4 million, rising by 6.7% but the growth 
speed declined by 15%. There was a sharp reduction in the profits of Chinese automobile 
manufacturers. 
In order to promote the development of Chinese automobile manufacturers during 
the financial crisis, the Chinese government was quick in making effective decisions 
regarding any assistance being provided to the local automobile firms. The government 
 85
introduced a massive stimulus package intended to help out the auto industry.  From a 
technology standpoint, this was to be done through reducing the purchase tax of 
passenger automobiles with low emissions, supporting Chinese automobile 
manufacturers in developing independent innovation and technical reform, and driving 
the development of electric powered automobiles and its crucial accessories. On the 
business end, the stimulus offered purchase subsidy policies to specific targets so as to 
promote automobile consumption, advanced mergers and acquisitions among the 
automobile industry, supported Chinese automobile manufacturers to develop 
independent brands, and sped up the export base construction of automobile and 
accessories.  
Figure 6-1 China’s auto sale and prediction 
 
[The above figure shows a decline of Chinese auto sales as growth speed slows down.] 
 
         Source: China car time
Figure 6-2 China’s Car Growth Rate 
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6.2 Crisis in India 
India is the second fastest growing automobile market in the world. More than 3.7 
million automotive vehicles were produced in India in 2010. The industry has a turnover 
of more than USD $35 billion and provides direct and indirect employment to over 13 
million people.  
In February 2009, after citing an upcoming fall in the production numbers, State 
Bank of India greatly reduced the interest rates applied to automotive loans. In the 
starting months of 2009, a widespread marketing campaign was conducted by Tata 
Motors involving the launch of theTata Nano automobile. Described as a “people’s car,” 
Tata hoped that the consumers would be encouraged to buy this car at a time of severe 
financial  crisis because of its cheap price tag, which was about twenty-one hundred 
dollars. “Consumers tend to go for best quality product at nominal rate.”63 
These and many attempts taken by the government to take control of the crisis or 
even to give advantage to the local manufacturers went on to help the local consumers as 
well as the manufacturers, and therefore the Indian automotive sector not only emerged 
from the crisis but continued going stronger on all terms such as manufacturing, 
attracting foreign investment, and so on. One of the main reasons for this rapid rise is the 
growing middle class in India, which prefers to buy cars rather than use the public 
transportation system.  
Another key advantage that the Indian car manufacturers have is cheap labor. This 
tends to make India a very profitable venture to do business in for the rest of the world 
since it offers such a large reduction in the costs of doing business when compared to any 
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developed Western nation.  “Cheap labor is one of the main reasons why firms choose to 
invest in the developing world.”64 Still, whatever the cause, the Indian automotive sector 
has the potential to grow even further and take a much bigger share in the global market.   
Figure 6-3 India - Auto sales growth 
 
[The above chart shows how the Indian market emerged from the auto crisis through 
strong sales in its multi-purpose vehicles.] 
6.3 Crisis in Japan 
The crisis in the U.S. automotive industry hit Japan like a tsunami. Thousands of 
workers lost their jobs. During the summer of 2008, a double-digit decline was reported 
by Toyota, its first annual loss in decades. This was similar to the figures being reported 
by Big Three firms in the U.S. Toyota associated this with its slow sales in Tundra 
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pickups alongside a shortage of sales in its fuel-efficient brands like Corolla, Yaris, and 
Prius. The automotive industry, seen as the engine of the nation’s economy, was facing a 
severe threat. 
Figure 6-4 Drop in Japanese Motor Vehicle Sales 
 
           Source: CEIC Data 
In response, Toyota announced plans to idle its truck plants as well as shift  
production towards other plants in order to focus more on the manufacture of in-demand 
vehicles. Toyota declared in December 2008 that it was expecting its first ever loss in 
seventy years of business in core vehicle making. This total loss was around $1.7 billion 
related to the Toyota’s group operating revenue. Toyota also saw its sales drop to about 
thirty-four percent.  
December 22, 2008 was the day when Toyota slashed the forecasts of its profits 
due to a slump in its sales. Often regarded alongside Honda as a huge success story and 
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an inspiration for the entire local industries to follow, Toyota issued a statement saying 
that it was expecting a narrow profit of five hundred and fifty-five million dollars for the 
fiscal year ending in March 2009. Before this, Toyota had been projecting a huge profit of 
about fourteen billion dollars for that period. Sales in America as well as in the overall 
European markets were down by thirty-four percent for Toyota. All of this accumulated 
towards a loss estimated to be around two billion dollars. The President of Toyota, 
Katsuaki Watanabe, said that the impacts on the firm from the dire economic conditions 
had been much wider, deeper, and faster than previously expected. He also noted that the 
change which had affected the global economies was of an size and scale which only 
occurs about once every hundred years, adding that Toyota was looking for loans from 
the government in Japan while facing its first ever losses in some sixty years of its global 
operations. Toyota announced on November 4, 2009, that it was immediately 
withdrawing from Formula One, thereby completely ending its involvement in this sport 
after eight seasons.  
Honda motor’s sales also felt by 31.6 percent. The Honda motor firm announced 
in December 2008 that it would be immediately leaving Formula One mainly because the 
2008 economic crisis necessitated selling off their team. Honda also indicated that 
following this action there could be large reductions in their contract staff as well as part-
time employees. The bonuses of upper management were also to be reassessed: the 
directors of the firm were to take a ten percent cut in their pay effective from January 
2009. “Leadership of any firm should be flexible enough to absorb any upcoming 
changes quickly.”65 
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Other Japanese car manufacturers reported similar problems. Nissan reported its 
first annual loss of $2.7 billion and announced that it intended to cut production as well 
as reducing its total output by eighty thousand vehicles for the starting months of 2009.  
Suzuki, the fourth biggest Japanese car manufacturer, announced in December 
2008 that it would slash its Japanese production by about thirty thousand units mainly 
because of falling demand. Suzuki also expected to face its first significant drop in profit 
levels in eight years mainly due to the financial crisis. Fuji Heavy Industries, the biggest 
Japanese transport equipment manufacturer as well as the maker of the Subaru model of 
cars, announced in December 2008 that it would be exiting from the World Rally 
Championship by the end of its 2008 season. The main reason for this was described as a 
response towards a widespread economic downturn which was badly affecting the 
automotive industry in general and other industries related to the main automotive sector 
as well. This announcement came a day after Fuji’s competitor Suzuki exited from the 
championships.  
According to many reports in December 2008, Mitsubishi Motors was also set to 
broaden its production slashes because of the continuous fall in demand of its products. 
Mitsubishi, a well-known maker of Japanese Outlander sport-utility vehicles, announced 
it would eliminate the night shifts completely at two of its domestic factories because the 
severe global recession was drying out   demand for their automobiles. “Job cuts in any 
business should be proportional to its fall in profits or rise in losses.”66  
The company would also halt its Mizushima plant’s night shift, excluding only the 
mini car line; besides this the night work at its Okazaki plant was to be halted as well 
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starting February 2.  These slashes were a part of Mitsubishi’s overall strategy to reduce 
its output by one hundred and ten thousand vehicles for the fiscal year ending in March, 
mainly due to the falling sales in Japan, Europe, and the United States. “Firms often tend 
to lower the median pay instead of cutting jobs, depending on what suits them.”67  
It was also estimated that sales in Japan would fall to their lowest levels in the last 
thirty years in 2009, according to the Japanese automobile manufacturers association. 
Mitsubishi would also halt its passenger car production on every Friday of the upcoming 
month at its Mizushima factory. The plant in Okazaki was to close on every Saturday for 
the month of January as well as for five more days.  
The Japanese Government provided loans through government-affiliated financial 
institutions, and started tax reductions for fuel-efficient automobiles with good 
environmental performance. It extended loans to mid- and large-sized companies which 
were in trouble in regards to cash management; expanding a safety-net guarantee and 
lending facility for small and medium firms. The government also expanded loans and 
guarantees for Japanese-affiliate companies raising long-term funds overseas, and 
provided a certain proportion of tax exemptions on both new and used cars which were 
between 50% to 75%. The Japanese government also adopted a scrapping schemes and 
encouraged the purchase new environmental-friendly vehicles. 
6.4 Crisis in South Korea 
The automakers in South Korea were generally observed to be at much more 
profitable levels as compared to their Japanese and American counterparts, recording 
better than expected growth figures in many of the depressed markets like that of the 
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United States. Even despite the global economic crisis, the firm Hyundai-Kia was 
successful in overtaking Honda Motors in 2008 as world’s fourth largest automaker. The 
continued success of Hyundai-Kia was very unusual at a time when almost all of the 
global automakers were experiencing a significant sales drop, with the leading auto 
manufacturer General Motors even filing for bankruptcy protection. Hyundai-Kia took 
great advantages from the automotive crisis by producing high quality yet affordable as 
well as well-designed vehicles.  
Due to the factors of rapid globalization, car manufacturing plants have been set 
up at different locations throughout the globe such as in China, Eastern Europe, and the 
U.S. Manufacturing facilities have been upgraded in order to produce products which are 
engineered and designed for many different markets throughout the globe. Here, the 
example of the Kia Cee’d is a leading one in which the product has been developed, 
engineered, and designed in Germany and then built in Slovakia.  
Unlike for many other firms throughout the world, the automotive crisis was 
turned into a blessing for different South Korean automakers. The automaker Hyundai 
made many great offers to its customers such as those who had lost their jobs could now 
return their newly purchased car for a refund. This success and continued growth was 
attributed to the nation’s well equipped and fuel efficient yet affordable automobiles with 
great warranties like the Kia Cee’d, the Hyundai i30, and the Kia Picanto which attracted 
consumers globally at a time of extremely severe economic slowdown, increasing 
environmental concerns, and significantly rising oil prices. All of these factors gave the 
automakers in South Korea a great competitive advantage against many of the luxury 
vehicles and SUVs from the American, German, and Japanese automakers, especially in 
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thefourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, at the height of the entire 
automotive crisis.  
South Korean monetary policy helped as well, boosting the South Korean won in 
global currency markets. This was especially true against the Japanese Yen and the 
American Dollar, which also became a significant factor in boosting the price 
competitiveness of exports of South Korea in many of the global key markets. “Currency 
rates are greatly argued on international level since it may give unfair advantage to some 
firms or nations.”68 
Another important factor which helped in maintaining this positive momentum 
was rapidly improving brand awareness; this was attributed to the positive reviews and 
the awards the firm received throughout this time from many different sources. The brand 
of Hyundai grew by 9% in 2008; this was enough to surpass Ferrari and Porsche. It also 
utilized the sporting event of the Super Bowl for the promotion of its Hyundai brand in 
America; this was the most expensive airtime for commercials in the world.  
Yet even after all of these success factors, the automakers in South Korea were 
not completely immune to the automotive crisis. An example of this comes from the 
Hyundai Motor Company which in December 2008 was beginning to reduce its 
production at various different plants located in India, China, Turkey, Slovakia, and the 
United States. This was mainly because of fall in demand at various sectors of its sales 
throughout the globe. “Shifting the manufacturing plants elsewhere in the world often 
tends to bring more profits depending on factors such as cheap labor”.69  
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The firm also missed its earlier projection of four million eight hundred thousand 
units for the year 2008, and therefore announced it was freezing the wages for workers in 
administration as well as shortening its factory operations because demand was 
weakening amid the global financial crisis.  
Sang Yong Motors, he fourth largest automaker in South Korea and owned by the 
Chinese manufacturer Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), was the worst 
affected South Korean firm in the entire crisis, This was largely due to its mainly 
manufacturing SUVs which were dependent on heavy fuel consumption and 
consequently less popular during the economic downturn. This firm recorded losses in 
four straight quarters. By 2008’s end they had losses of $20.8 million dollars for the third 
quarter.  
In the period from July to September in 2008, total sales plummeted sixty-three 
percent to three thousand eight hundred and thirty-five vehicles. Its production lines were 
idle after December 17 to apply reductions in its inventory. The automaker also halted its 
production twice during the auto crisis. In December 2008, the parent firm SAIC gave the 
Sang Yong union an ultimatum to accept its plans regarding restructuring or face a 
complete withdrawal from the parent company. If this had been done then it would have 
translated into certain bankruptcy for Sang Yong.  
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Due to the global crisis, the Korean government took the temporary policy action 
of reducing the sales tax on vehicles by 30% for the period December 2008 to June 2009 
in order to promote sales. This policy was extended until the end of 2009. Moreover, the
government launched a “Green Growth New Deal” to overcome the current economic 
crisis, which included subsidizing the development of “green” cars and fuels. This 
subsidy, amounting to over 2.2 trillion won, was allocated for automakers to design 
electronic and hybrid cars and to develop auto engines using “green” fuels. As such, the 
government played a significant role in nurturing and restructuring the auto industry 
during the economic crisis. 
Figure 6-5 Hyundai’s Car Sales 
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7.     Government Stimulus 
Government support for the automotive industry has been provided in a variety of 
forms, including subsidies to firms and direct involvement in industry restructuring plans. 
However, government interference is always a controversial topic.  
The US Government committed nearly $40 billion to assist the automotive 
industry (half of which was in the form of direct loans to Chrysler and GM) and another 
$5 billion to supplier support programs, and also set up community assistance programs 
to intervene in regions that were subject to difficulties as a result of the restructuring of 
the industry. The debate remains whether this was too much or too little support. Given 
the way the governments were getting involved, they were also assuming responsibility 
for the outcomes of their actions. The risk that therefore arises from government support 
is that companies will continue to build cars for a market where there is no demand for 
what is being produced. 
In France, there was restricted room for politicians. The government had an 
implicit collaboration with the companies not to close any plants in exchange for public 
funds. Other types of long-term commitment, such as agreements on the types of cars to 
be produced in the future, would possibly be more useful. These actions are regarded as 
protectionism.  
In the case of Italy, the government was highly restricted when it came to giving 
money to the automotive industry. The general policy was that while no plant would be 
shut down, only a crisis putting a company at severe risk would constitute a valid reason 
for government support.  
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The action taken by Chinese Government included a cut in sales tax on smaller 
cars, from 10% to 5%, a policy which was valid only in 2009. Another policy was the 
increased consumption tax on vehicles with larger engines. Also, China published 
regulations for passenger cars stating the need to achieve fuel efficiency standards. A 
number of national companies have since grown into strong players so the external 
multinationals are no longer threatening the domestic industry. 
The cultural differences between the US, European, Chinese, Japanese, Indian, 
etc. automotive industries are a fact. However, global competitiveness applies to all, and 
needs to be faced and dealt with. As a result of the crisis, the trend towards further 
consolidation of car manufacturers will be accelerated. About 18 global car 
manufacturers in the three old core automotive regions – the United States, Western 
Europe and Japan/Korea – will be significantly reduced in number over the next five 
years. They will be challenged by car manufacturers based in China and India. 
Many countries introduced car scrapping schemes (CARS or “cash for clunkers” 
in the US) to cushion the overall downturn in economic activity, boosting sales in the 
short term. As these programs were temporary and consisted mostly in a shift of 
purchases from the future to the present, the surge in sales is likely to be reversed after 
the schemes end. Evidence on the timing and magnitude of this “payback effect” varies 
but suggests that over the short term, car sales may be temporarily depressed by the 
termination of scrapping programs in many countries.  
[Table 7-1 below shows that most of the countries’ governments would reduce or exempt 
the automobile requisition tax on small to medium-sized cars, and/or on 
eco/environmentally-friendly cars. ] 
 
Table 7-1 Principle measure to support the automobile sector
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To summarize, the government stimulus included the following methods:
1. Direct loans to automotive manufacturers, w
effective method to rescue auto companies in most of the countries during the 
crisis. The US government’s bailout of GM and Chrysler is one of the biggest 
economic headlines dating back to the 2007 economic crisis.
2. Scrapping schemes, which were promote
proved to be an efficient way to boost auto sales in the short
quite controversial due to their long
3. Tax schemes which included tax reductions and exemptions were a very 
popular method adopted b
automotive markets.
4. Incentives for investment in R&D and training was an indirect but long
method to help the auto industry via better technology and better
employers. 
hich proved the most direct 
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5. Targeted “green” incentives to promote electric, hybrid, and other 
environmental-friendly vehicles were one of the most important long-term 
methods, which clearly show the trend of the automotive industry’s future. 
6. Other liquidity help for firms, like subsidies for manufacturers’ financing 
operations, also showed obvious effects with regards to assisting 
manufacturers. 
7. Exchange-rate management was put on the agenda in countries like the US, 
China, Japan, and South Korea in order to enhance the competitiveness of 
domestic suppliers since exchange volatility can influence the volume of 
potential gains during trading on an international level. 
8. Tariffs or quantitative limits on trade were, for example, adopted by the 
Russian government to increase tariffs on imported cars and by the US 
government to level up the tariffs on Chinese tires. All protected their 
domestic manufacturers who benefitted to a certain degree. 
9. Other domestic content rules & practices, like the EU temporarily suspending 
free trade agreements with their Asian counterparts, had a certain effect on 
aiding their domestic markets during crisis. 
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8.     The Future of the Automotive Industry 
The crisis in the automotive industry was a sharp decline in a normal business 
cycle, rather than a bubble. Auto demand in the developed countries is expected to pick 
up again, though there may be changes in consumers’ choices. In the emerging market, 
continued growth of GDP and populations will provide additional stimulus to demand. 
In the developed world, the automotive industry will recover to pre-crisis levels as 
the global economy recovers. Populations continue to age; older households divert a 
greater proportion of income to vehicle purchase as they are relieved of the expense of 
raising children. Consumers may well be more cautious about new car purchases in the 
future, shifting to slightly less expensive cars. Thus the demand recovery may not be 
completely proportionate, but will perhaps be in the region of 95%.70  
In the developing world, demand is likely to return to 100% (even105%) of 
previous levels with the return of economic health. One of the reasons is that a large 
fraction of new car demand is “first car” rather than “replacement car” demand; hence it 
is less deferrable. The used car market is often very immature and inefficient, so demand 
flows primarily to new cars. Car finance availability has been patchy at best, such that 
few future buyers are currently weighed down by vehicle debt. The income elasticity of 
demand is higher than in the developed world, as even a small change in average GDP 
can bring millions of new buyers into car-buying range very quickly. As car purchase 
credit does become more available, more people will enter the car-buying market more 
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quickly.71  
The nature of competition will have a particular influence. In the future, the US 
market is expected to be more similar to the European one. Many autoworkers compete 
intensively for 8% - 15% of the overall market. Developing countries will experience 
intense competition among multinational OEMs, and new domestic firms will arise, 
strengthened by this competition. New entrants (e.g. Geely in China and Tata in India) 
will focus initially on high demand in their home markets, but will in a short time also 
start to export to developed markets. Not all automakers will be huge; a place will remain 
for highly capable smaller firms. 
In the future, the concept of “Build where you sell” will prevail; new entrants will 
pursue both mergers and acquisitions and “transplant” strategy. Large automakers, by 
holding a more integral vehicle design and increasing levels of technology, will continue 
to dominate the industry. Green initiatives will prompt a multiplicity of new technologies 
and fuel types, with none achieving dominance in short-to-medium term.  Employment 
levels will continue to be relatively high, although differently distributed. Wages will be 
lower and benefits under pressure.  
A greater availability of low-cost cars (e.g. Tata’s Nano, selling for around 
$3,500) is expected in the emerging markets. At higher incomes, ownership levels will 
increase to multiple vehicles per family. Even where the very best public transportation is 
available, total person trips tend to hit a threshold and future growth is absorbed by 
vehicle-based mobility.  
Overcapacity is always a problem in the US, where it is up to 40%. It also exists 
in Japan and Germany, which hit between 11-20%. It is forecasted that overcapacity of 
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global manufacturing will increase dramatically in the next five years.72  By 2016, China 
will have the most capacity, followed by other Asian countries as a whole excluding 
Japan. Therefore, balance capacity of production volumes becomes sufficient for OEMs 
to expand their business while at the same time keeping down fixed costs to maintain a 
healthy margin.  
There are several effective ways to solve overcapacity. First, cutting production 
on the manufacturers’ part. Second, encouraging consolidation and joint ventures. Third, 
driving sales by incentives. Fourth, raising brand profile to fortify market share. Fifth, 
increasing vehicle exports to existing or new markets. 
Other main factors and implications on the future of automotive industry are as 
follows: 
Manufacturing will move within regions, to lower labor cost areas.  
Product development will require new technological features, which will 
determine whether products succeed. Increased use of common parts may increase 
product development costs while decreasing purchasing costs. 
Automakers will retain a crucial systems integration role and hence will have 
more power than suppliers. Some suppliers may amass enough capabilities to become 
automakers.  
Purchases of small cars will closely follow the trend of gasoline prices. 
Controlling fuel taxes, regulating fuel efficiency standards, and carbon regulations are 
ways to change consumer and automaker behavior with respect to fuel efficiency. 
It is uncertain if employment will return to previous levels. The change in the 
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industry might also have negative implications for employment needs. Production will 
continue to move to lower cost areas and closer to emerging markets, where the future 
growth of demand is expected. Auto development will create more stable and high-
quality employment in the future. 
Last but not the least, there will be a long-term perspective on the automotive 
industry and climate change.73 Climate change and energy security concerns are the hot 
topic in  recent years for the automotive industry. CO2 reduction in the automotive 
industry has been discussed for quite a while. Fuel savings and emissions reduction are 
two different problems but lead to the same challenge – how to make vehicles more 
efficient, while keeping additional costs at an acceptable level so as to make “green” 
vehicles attractive to consumers. Low-emission vehicles offer the most convincing 
solution on the road to sustainable mobility. Manufacturers will focus on innovation to 
drive forward cleaner, “greener,” and more affordable vehicles. Further CO2 reduction 
will come from improved powertrain and the development of more renewable energy 
source. What vehicle manufacturers spend on new technologies will be to gain more 
opportunities for themselves in the future, as well as building a base of protection for 
their future development. Climate change is a global challenge which will affect us all; 
therefore, solutions must beglobal. There is a trend that vehicle manufacturers, fuel and 
energy producers, traffic management, logistics providers, politician, legislators, 
consumers, and drivers will be working together to deliver the greatest benefits to society. 
74
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Figure 8-1 Hybrid production by country of brand origin 2006 and 2014
                
               Source: PwC Automotive Institute
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9.     Conclusion 
This paper presented a detailed analysis on how the automotive crisis of 2008 
affected  car manufacturers. First examined was the relationship between the financial 
crisis and the auto industry. As consumer credit and car loans tightened, car sales 
decreased dramatically. Economic activity in the automotive industry usually moves in 
line with the overall business cycle and a high correlation is also found between car sales 
and private consumption. Then, the paper focused on American auto manufacturers, 
especially the Big Three firms – namely General Motors, Chrysler and Ford – since they 
were affected the most. It was seen that automobile sales in the United States were in a 
decline even before the crisis started, mainly due to other factors which were closely 
related to the auto industry such as the oil crisis. This directly led to American consumers 
making a shift in their priorities and opting to buy smaller vehicles rather than the large 
SUV’s, which had been the common choice.  
 The Big Three also pointed to some labor related statistics which showed how 
many personnel were employed by the auto industry in the United States. Besides this the 
hourly wages as well as benefits were discussed in some detail. In terms of salaries of 
employees related to this industry, it was seen that experience mattered greatly, and 
unionized workers such as from UAW got benefits from their employers through schemes 
like the Jobs Bank. It was also argued that from the perspective of the employers, it was a 
huge expenditure to do business with the workers since they were getting so many 
benefits such as hourly rates, paid holidays, and even pensions. Therefore many analysts 
argued that this scheme was a great hurdle keeping the companies from doing much more 
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progressive things where the capital could have been applied.   
It was also argued that the American companies were in severe crisis because they 
had a lot of brands to look after, so after this two main types of claims were analyzed 
where the first argued that the failure of the auto industry would be a great failure for the 
economy itself. Supporters of this argument asserted that since the auto industry was 
hiring millions of employees as well as helping the nation to lift its standards of living, 
therefore it should be rescued, whereas the opponents said that the industry should be 
made accountable for its mismanagement.  
One key point to note here is regarding Chapter 11 bankruptcy; many arguments 
were in favor as well as opposition of applying this procedure. Some points were noted 
which focused on asking the U.S government to facilitate the sale of the auto companies’ 
assets as well as taking a more active role in the restructuring processes of the auto 
industries. In contrast, many arguments were also against any government intervention in 
this industry.  
A timeline was discussed in detail regarding the federal government’s bailout 
procedure as well as how the bailout bill was approved. Later on the issues dealing with 
bankruptcy of General Motors and Chrysler were also noted. Some image issues 
regarding the firms were discussed in which General Motors was apologetic for their 
actions, as well as the selling of assets by the CEO’s of the Big Three firms in order to 
answer the critics and maintain a positive image in the eye of common consumer. The 
Big Three firms also intended to invest in more eco-friendly technologies in the future.  
 After the analysis of the American auto industry, there was a brief look at how the 
auto industry crisis affected other major markets around the globe. In Europe, the United 
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Kingdom and Italy were observed to be impacted much harder due to the crisis as 
compared to Germany which relied on the positive image of its brands, its power of 
export, and the rise in demand from developing economies to lift up its auto industry. A 
detailed analysis was also given on Canada and how it managed to emerge from the 
crisis; here the top-level management of auto firms was observed to be more responsible 
in accepting their responsibilities afterwards the crisis as compared to their American 
counterparts.   
The Asian markets were also affected greatly by the crisis but they also emerged 
much stronger, the Chinese manufacturers were aided by a huge stimulus from the 
government, the Indians relied on their domestic consumption, and the Japanese took 
difficult management decisions regarding many issues in order to ensure their survival as 
well as their ability to compete. In all of Asia, the Korean auto manufacturers were seen 
as the least affected by the crisis and according to some analysts they even profited while 
the majority of the key global manufacturers were suffering from losses. 
Finally, the future of automotive industry and the role of governments during 
crisis was discussed. Though the government intervention was quite controversial, it 
turned out to be successful. The future trends of the auto industry in the developed and 
developing world were also examined, along with some efficient measures governments 
might use going forward to rescue the auto companies. The measures taken did, in 
general, benefit the auto sector but the drawbacks they created cannot be ignore. 
The crisis in the automotive industry was not just a result of the credit crisis. 
Otherwise, the industry only would have needed to wait until growth picked up again. In 
reality, it needed to think how to restructure and rethink products and strategies. The 
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crisis in the automotive industry was not only an outcome of the financial crisis, but also 
an opportunity to seek a new model of sustainability for the industry.  
The restructuring of the automotive industry will bring both new winners and new 
losers. Production will shift to new auto zones, and new fuel-efficient vehicles can 
potentially lead to a new boom in vehicle sales. The final questions with regard to the 
crisis and the future of the automotive industry are which companies and countries will 
be able to take advantage of the industry’s new opportunities, and how this can be done 
as a joint collaboration between all social partners. 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX A 
Table A  Sale and share of total market by manufacturer 
        Sales     
 ETD 
Sales                     
        
% Market 
Shar
e   
  Sep-12 Sep-11 
% 
Chg 2012 2011 % Chg 
Sep-
12 Sep-11 
YTD 
2012 
YTD 
2011 
General Motors Corp. 210,245 207,145 1.5 1,967,715 1,902,149 3.4 17.7 19.7 18.1 20 
   Total Cars 88,996 68,895 29.2 812,678 764,196 6.3 7.5 6.5 7.5 8 
     Domestic Car 88,540 67,484 31.2 809,752 735,216 10.1 7.4 6.4 7.4 7.7 
     Import Car 456 1,411 
-
67.7 2,926 28,980 -89.9 ... 0.1 ... 0.3 
   Total Light Trucks 121,249 138,250 
-
12.3 1,155,037 1,137,953 1.5 10.2 13.1 10.6 12 
     Domestic Truck 121,249 138,250 
-
12.3 1,155,037 1,137,953 1.5 10.2 13.1 10.6 12 
     Import Truck ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Ford Motor Company 174,454 174,860 -0.2 1,685,068 1,599,711 5.3 14.7 16.6 15.5 16.8 
   Total Cars 50,694 49,876 1.6 586,197 568,970 3 4.3 4.7 5.4 6 
     Domestic Car 50,694 49,876 1.6 586,197 568,970 3 4.3 4.7 5.4 6 
     Import Car ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
   Total Light Trucks 123,760 124,984 -1 1,098,871 1,030,741 6.6 10.4 11.9 10.1 10.8 
     Domestic Truck 123,760 124,984 -1 1,098,871 1,030,741 6.6 10.4 11.9 10.1 10.8 
     Import Truck ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Chrysler LLC 142,041 127,334 11.5 1,250,670 1,009,411 23.9 11.9 12.1 11.5 10.6 
   Total Cars 42,050 33,217 26.6 377,781 258,239 46.3 3.5 3.2 3.5 2.7 
     Domestic Car 42,050 33,217 26.6 377,781 258,239 46.3 3.5 3.2 3.5 2.7 
     Import Car ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
   Total Light Trucks 99,991 94,117 6.2 872,889 751,172 16.2 8.4 8.9 8 7.9 
     Domestic Truck 99,991 94,117 6.2 872,889 751,172 16.2 8.4 8.9 8 7.9 
     Import Truck ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Toyota Motor Sales USA 
Inc. 171,910 121,451 41.5 1,571,424 1,194,524 31.6 14.5 11.5 14.4 12.5 
   Total Cars 97,662 67,097 45.6 915,274 652,290 40.3 8.2 6.4 8.4 6.9 
     Domestic Car 58,658 39,550 48.3 547,239 382,210 43.2 4.9 3.8 5 4 
     Import Car 39,004 27,547 41.6 368,035 270,080 36.3 3.3 2.6 3.4 2.8 
   Total Light Trucks 74,248 54,354 36.6 656,150 542,234 21 6.2 5.2 6 5.7 
     Domestic Truck 64,438 45,658 41.1 556,660 453,307 22.8 5.4 4.3 5.1 4.8 
     Import Truck 9,810 8,696 12.8 99,490 88,927 11.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 
American Honda Motor Co 
Inc. 117,211 89,532 30.9 1,066,458 859,797 24 9.9 8.5 9.8 9 
   Total Cars 62,657 43,809 43 585,649 465,740 25.7 5.3 4.2 5.4 4.9 
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     Domestic Car 55,182 34,556 59.7 508,372 364,630 39.4 4.6 3.3 4.7 3.8 
     Import Car 7,475 9,253 
-
19.2 77,277 101,110 -23.6 0.6 0.9 0.7 1.1 
   Total Light Trucks 54,554 45,723 19.3 480,809 394,057 22 4.6 4.3 4.4 4.1 
     Domestic Truck 54,172 40,626 33.3 442,143 363,329 21.7 4.6 3.9 4.1 3.8 
     Import Truck 382 5,097 
-
92.5 38,666 30,728 25.8 ... 0.5 0.4 0.3 
Nissan North America Inc. 91,907 92,964 -1.1 866,484 774,079 11.9 7.7 8.8 7.9 8.1 
   Total Cars 56,953 61,685 -7.7 550,571 513,809 7.2 4.8 5.9 5.1 5.4 
     Domestic Car 47,527 50,394 -5.7 451,573 406,784 11 4 4.8 4.1 4.3 
     Import Car 9,426 11,291 
-
16.5 98,998 107,025 -7.5 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.1 
   Total Light Trucks 34,954 31,279 11.7 315,913 260,270 21.4 2.9 3 2.9 2.7 
     Domestic Truck 17,251 14,719 17.2 156,886 118,568 32.3 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 
     Import Truck 17,703 16,560 6.9 159,027 141,702 12.2 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 
Hyundai Motor America 60,025 52,051 15.3 539,814 492,914 9.5 5 4.9 5 5.2 
   Total Cars 46,850 41,297 13.4 443,669 393,201 12.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.1 
   Total Light Trucks 13,175 10,754 22.5 96,145 99,713 -3.6 1.1 1 0.9 1 
Mazda Motor of America 
Inc. 24,135 25,521 -5.4 209,484 191,315 9.5 2 2.4 1.9 2 
   Total Cars 16,695 14,519 15 141,248 120,305 17.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 
     Domestic Car 1,403 4,163 
-
66.3 29,653 24,914 19 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 
     Import Car 15,292 10,356 47.7 111,595 95,391 17 1.3 1 1 1 
   Total Light Trucks 7,440 11,002 
-
32.4 68,236 71,010 -3.9 0.6 1 0.6 0.7 
     Domestic Truck ... 180 
-
100 505 2,082 -75.7 ... ... ... ... 
     Import Truck 7,440 10,822 
-
31.3 67,731 68,928 -1.7 0.6 1 0.6 0.7 
Mitsubishi Motors N A, Inc. 4,806 5,803 
-
17.2 46,122 65,875 -30 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 
   Total Cars 1,934 2,671 
-
27.6 26,604 36,866 -27.8 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 
     Domestic Car 572 1,118 
-
48.8 13,397 20,813 -35.6 ... 0.1 0.1 0.2 
     Import Car 1,362 1,553 
-
12.3 13,207 16,053 -17.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
   Total Light Trucks 2,872 3,132 -8.3 19,518 29,009 -32.7 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 
     Domestic Truck 16 778 
-
97.9 483 9,123 -94.7 ... 0.1 ... 0.1 
     Import Truck 2,856 2,354 21.3 19,035 19,886 -4.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Kia Motors America Inc. 48,105 35,609 35.1 434,914 367,405 18.4 4 3.4 4 3.9 
   Total Cars 33,854 18,505 82.9 302,127 210,917 43.2 2.8 1.8 2.8 2.2 
   Total Light Trucks 14,251 17,104 16.7 132,787 156,488 -15.1 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.6 
Subaru of America Inc. 27,683 20,934 32.2 245,503 195,550 25.5 2.3 2 2.3 2.1 
   Total Cars 21,286 14,086 51.1 187,162 137,199 36.4 1.8 1.3 1.7 1.4 
     Domestic Car 14,707 10,746 36.9 120,793 106,129 13.8 1.2 1 1.1 1.1 
     Import Car 6,579 3,340 97 66,369 31,070 113.6 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.3 
   Total Light Trucks 6,397 6,848 -6.6 58,341 58,351 ... 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 
     Domestic Truck 139 256 45.7 1,538 1,970 -21.9 ... ... ... ... 
     Import Truck 6,258 6,592 -5.1 56,803 56,381 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 
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American Suzuki Motor 
Corp. 1,921 2,026 -5.2 19,149 20,284 -5.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
   Total Cars 416 469 
-
11.3 4,391 5,447 -19.4 ... ... ... 0.1 
     Domestic Car ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
     Import Car 416 469 
-
11.3 4,391 5,447 -19.4 ... ... ... 0.1 
   Total Light Trucks 1,505 1,557 -3.3 14,758 14,837 -0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
     Domestic Truck 157 188 
-
16.5 1,436 1,643 -12.6 ... ... ... ... 
     Import Truck 1,348 1,369 -1.5 13,322 13,194 1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Mercedes-Benz 24,950 23,428 6.5 207,048 182,510 13.4 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.9 
   Total Cars 15,451 14,496 6.6 124,665 111,237 12.1 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.2 
   Total Light Trucks 9,499 8,932 6.3 82,383 71,273 15.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 
     Domestic Truck 4,416 5,100 
-
13.4 46,089 40,817 12.9 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 
     Import Truck 5,083 3,832 32.6 36,294 30,456 19.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Saab ... 429 
-
100 480 4,612 -89.6 ... ... ... ... 
   Total Cars ... 381 
-
100 430 4,482 -90.4 ... ... ... ... 
   Total Light Trucks ... 48 
-
100 50 130 -61.5 ... ... ... ... 
     Domestic Truck ... 48 
-
100 50 130 -61.5 ... ... ... ... 
     Import Truck ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Volvo 4,977 5,042 -1.3 51,634 52,155 -1 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
   Total Cars 2,194 2,868 
-
23.5 26,604 29,805 -10.7 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 
   Total Light Trucks 2,783 2,174 28 25,030 22,350 12 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Volkswagen of America Inc. 36,339 27,036 34.4 323,090 235,458 37.2 3.1 2.6 3 2.5 
   Total Cars 32,487 23,599 37.7 284,877 200,182 42.3 2.7 2.2 2.6 2.1 
     Domestic Car 17,702 15,746 12.4 151,645 138,752 9.3 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 
     Import Car 14,785 7,853 88.3 133,232 61,430 116.9 1.2 0.7 1.2 0.6 
   Total Light Trucks 3,852 3,437 12.1 38,213 35,276 8.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Audi of America Inc. 12,302 9,725 26.5 100,694 84,981 18.5 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 
   Total Cars 8,995 6,950 29.4 73,455 60,646 21.1 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 
   Total Light Trucks 3,307 2,775 19.2 27,239 24,335 11.9 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 
BMW of North America Inc. 21,761 21,750 0.1 186,397 177,679 4.9 1.8 2.1 1.7 1.9 
   Total Cars 12,695 15,407 
-
17.6 127,752 128,033 -0.2 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.3 
     Domestic Car ... 140 
-
100 ... 2,932 -100 ... ... ... ... 
     Import Car 12,695 15,267 
-
16.8 127,752 125,101 2.1 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.3 
   Total Light Trucks 9,066 6,343 42.9 58,645 49,646 18.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 
     Domestic Truck 7,496 6,334 18.3 56,499 48,995 15.3 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 
     Import Truck 1,570 9 
999.
9 2,146 651 229.6 0.1 ... ... ... 
Porsche Cars NA Inc. 2,736 2,170 26.1 25,015 22,664 10.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
   Total Cars 1,366 1,240 10.2 14,681 12,633 16.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
   Total Light Trucks 1,370 930 47.3 10,334 10,031 3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Jaguar * 1,004 1,111 -9.6 9,550 9,315 2.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
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Land Rover ** 3,636 2,740 32.7 31,674 25,650 23.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Mini * 4,899 3,999 22.5 48,531 41,635 16.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Ferrari * 207 183 13.1 1,437 1,266 13.5 ... ... ... ... 
Maserati * 269 199 35.2 1,984 1,706 16.3 ... ... ... ... 
Bentley * 239 151 58.3 1,644 1,260 30.5 ... ... ... ... 
Rolls Royce * 21 28 -25 223 255 -12.5 ... ... ... ... 
Maybach * 5 4 25 48 33 45.5 ... ... ... ... 
Total Car 600,956 487,239 23.3 5,656,927 4,733,646 19.5 50.5 46.2 51.9 49.7 
     Domestic Car 177,564 149,215 19 1,743,914 1,577,544 10.5 14.9 14.2 16 16.6 
     Import Car 423,392 338,024 25.3 3,913,013 3,156,102 24 35.6 32.1 35.9 33.2 
Total Truck 587,909 566,483 3.8 5,243,022 4,784,526 9.6 49.5 53.8 48.1 50.3 
     Domestic Truck 345,000 357,351 -3.5 3,126,797 2,919,866 7.1 29 33.9 28.7 30.7 
     Import Truck 242,909 209,132 16.2 2,116,225 1,864,660 13.5 20.4 19.8 19.4 19.6 
TOTAL LIGHT VEHICLE 
SALES 1,188,865 1,053,722 12.8 10,899,949 9,518,172 14.5 100 100 100 100 
Selling Days 25 25 ... 230 229 ... ... ... ... ... 
† Estimate * Imported cars 
only ** Imported trucks only                     
Source: 
www.motorintelligence.com                     
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APPENDIX B 
Table B  Top 20 vehicles, current month's sales 
  Sep-12 
% Chg from 
'11 
YTD 
2012   
% Chg from 
YTD 2011 
Ford F - Series PU 55,077 1.2 463,733   11.4 
Chevrolet 
Silverado PU 36,425 -16.6 298,200   0.6 
Toyota Camry 34,252 37.8 314,788   37.1 
Honda Accord 29,182 56.6 247,847   36.9 
Dodge Ram PU 25,973 5.9 213,593   20 
Chevrolet Cruze 25,787 42.5 180,600 -3.7   
Nissan Altima 24,448 0.4 234,040   16.7 
Ford Escape 23,148 14.5 200,075   6.5 
Toyota Corolla / 
Matrix 23,026 42.6 222,703   19.2 
Honda CR-V 22,268 13.6 213,381   32.5 
Honda Civic 21,546 57 234,029   39.8 
Ford Focus 19,736 91.4 186,686   36 
Toyota Prius 18,932 103 183,340   96.6 
Hyundai Elantra 18,305 27.2 152,575   3.1 
Hyundai Sonata 17,332 -4.7 175,346   0.3 
Chevrolet Equinox 15,835 2.2 166,862   15 
Chevrolet Impala 15,259 10.4 140,179   1.5 
Volkswagen Jetta 14,750 -1.8 127,028 -7.3   
Kia Optima 14,304 131 114,728   105.8 
Ford Explorer 14,049 23.9 117,803   21.5 
 
Source: www.motorintelligence.com 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C  Segment totals, ranked by Sep unit sales 
  Sep-12 
% Chg from 
Sep '11 YTD 2012 % Chg from YTD 2011 
Cars 600,956 23.3 5,656,927   19.5 
   Midsize 278,935 15.8 2,800,376   21.6 
   Small 240,288 49.9 2,099,090   24.2 
   Luxury 80,863 -1.2 750,206   10.6 
   Large 870 -79.4 7,255 -88.3   
Light-duty trucks 587,909 3.8 5,243,022   9.6 
   Pickup 165,695 -3.4 1,416,783   8.5 
   Cross-over 250,133 13.1 2,234,046   9.1 
   Minivan 67,151 3.2 640,725   16.9 
   Midsize SUV 57,979 6.4 520,044   11.6 
   Large SUV 18,107 -29.6 168,771 -7.4   
   Small SUV 16,578 6.9 150,219   16.8 
   Luxury SUV 12,266 -6.3 112,434   5.7 
Total SUV/Cross-
over 355,063 7.6 3,185,514   8.7 
Total SUV 104,930 -3.6 951,468   7.7 
Total Cross-over 250,133 13.1 2,234,046   9.1 
 
Source: www.motorintelligence.com 
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APPENDIX D 
Table D  New passenger car registrations by market 
EUROPEAN UNION* July July 
% 
Chg Jan - Jul Jan - Jul % Chg 
      '12 '11 12/11 '12 '11 12/11 
AUSTRIA 28,268 29,307 -3.5 215,226 216,900 -0.8 
BELGIUM 36,701 34,886 +5.2 321,817 361,331 -10.9 
BULGARIA 1,616 1,826 -11.5 11,386 10,992 +3.6 
CYPRUS 1,021 979 +4.3 7,447 9,077 -18.0 
CZECH REPUBLIC 11,158 12,118 -7.9 105,391 100,402 +5.0 
DENMARK 16,718 13,068 +27.9 101,001 100,874 +0.1 
ESTONIA 1,526 1,173 +30.1 10,449 8,676 +20.4 
FINLAND 6,443 8,616 -25.2 73,372 79,974 -8.3 
FRANCE 148,924 160,199 -7.0 1,197,906 1,385,283 -13.5 
GERMANY 247,860 260,907 -5.0 1,882,261 1,883,486 -0.1 
GREECE 5,757 9,940 -42.1 38,186 65,216 -41.4 
HUNGARY 4,475 3,719 +20.3 32,260 26,887 +20.0 
IRELAND 4,431 4,079 +8.6 71,065 81,158 -12.4 
ITALY 109,452 138,510 -21.0 924,583 1,153,332 -19.8 
LATVIA 895 913 -2.0 6,357 5,995 +6.0 
LITHUANIA 1,051 1,072 -2.0 7,253 7,695 -5.7 
LUXEMBURG 4,195 4,529 -7.4 32,851 33,125 -0.8 
NETHERLANDS 31,078 42,092 -26.2 362,890 370,438 -2.0 
POLAND 20,898 23,134 -9.7 170,090 161,811 +5.1 
PORTUGAL  9,257 14,269 -35.1 62,661 106,128 -41.0 
ROMANIA 6,005 8,501 -29.4 39,348 40,259 -2.3 
SLOVAKIA 6,252 5,583 +12.0 40,568 39,766 +2.0 
SLOVENIA 4,105 4,743 -13.5 32,432 37,685 -13.9 
SPAIN 65,322 78,914 -17.2 471,393 521,126 -9.5 
SWEDEN 18,076 19,621 -7.9 160,709 176,663 -9.0 
UNITED KINGDOM 143,884 131,634 +9.3 1,201,564 1,161,272 +3.5 
EUROPEAN UNION 
(EU27)* 935,368 
1,014,33
2 -7.8 7,580,466 8,145,551 -6.9 
EU15 876,366 950,571 -7.8 7,117,485 7,696,306 -7.5 
EU11* 59,002 63,761 -7.5 462,981 449,245 +3.1 
ICELAND 574 444 +29.3 5,428 3,500 +55.1 
NORWAY 11,920 11,189 +6.5 81,275 79,694 +2.0 
SWITZERLAND 24,998 25,822 -3.2 202,308 184,296 +9.8 
EFTA 37,492 37,455 +0.1 289,011 267,490 +8.0 
EU27*+EFTA 972,860 
1,051,78
7 -7.5 7,869,477 8,413,041 -6.5 
EU15+EFTA 913,858 988,026 -7.5 7,406,496 7,963,796 -7.0 
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Table E  Sales by top manufacturing group in China
Source: LMC Automotive Monthly 
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 APPENDIX F 
BEIJING, Jan 17 (Reuters) - Car sales in China climbed 5.2 percent in 2011, the slowest 
pace since the nation's car culture took off at the turn of the century, as consumers 
shunned local brands after Beijing scrapped tax incentives for small cars.  
    A total of 14.5 million sedans, sport utility vehicles and multi-purpose vehicles were 
shipped to dealers last year, the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers 
(CAAM) said.  
Table F China 2011 car sales up 5.2 pct 
---------------------------------------------------------------  
                         Dec    pct change      y-t-d       pct  
---------------------------------------------------------------  
  NATIONAL TOTAL BY CAAM      
Cars                  1,368,900    4.6      14,472,400      5.2  
Vehicles              1,689,600    1.4      18,505,100      2.5  
---------------------------------------------------------------  
   The following table shows passenger car and vehicle sales in 
December and year-to-date by manufacturers (units; percent  
changes are from a year earlier).   
---------------------------------------------------------------  
                          Dec      pct change   y-t-d      pct   
---------------------------------------------------------------  
   *BMW                    NA       NA        232,586     37.6  
     BMW brands            NA       NA        217,068     37.0   
   
     7 Series              NA       NA         33,500     26.2   
     5 Series              NA       NA         70,850     68.4   
     3 Series              NA       NA         46,871     34.0   
     MINI                  NA       NA         15,518     47.7   
    Chery                  NA       NA         641,700 
   -5.9   
    Geely                 47,755  -15.8       421,385  
    1.3   
     Emgrand              10,941    NA            NA        NA   
     Englon               16,083    NA            NA        NA  
     GLEagle              20,731    NA            NA        NA  
    Mercedes-Benz         23,230    30        198,520      35.0  
     S-Class               3,700    NA         31,050       NA  
     SUV                   NA       NA         54,335       85  
      GLK                  NA       NA         23,805       NA  
      M-Class              NA       NA         15,860       NA  
   * Dongfeng             204,338   18.1     2,172,723  
   11.7  
     PV                  163,324   24.0     1,646,410     16.1   
     CV                   41,014   -0.5       526,313     -0.3   
     DF Nissan JV        132,392   20.3     1,477,289     15.8   
      PV                  92,957   34.0       960,775     27.0   
      CV                  39,435   -3.0       516,514     -0.4   
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     DF PSA JV            42,095    5.2       404,139      8.2   
     DF Honda             26,797   36.7       255,468     -2.0   
     DF Own brand car      1,475  -46.9        26,028     -6.0  
    Dongfeng Yueda Kia     NA       NA        432,518     29.0  
   *Changan                NA       NA       2,008,500 
  -15.6  
     Chongqing Changan   146,250  -10.2      1,663,841   -10.1  
     CFM                  41,623   -3.1        418,600     1.7   
    FAW                    NA       NA       2,601,400     1.7   
    Nissan               119,000   26.7     1,247,700  
   21.9   
   *Volkswagen             NA       NA      2,260,000  
   17.7   
     VW brand              NA       NA      1,720,000     13.8   
     Audi brand            NA       NA        313,036     37.0  
      Imported             NA       NA         57,900     89.0  
     Skoda                 NA       NA        220,100     21.9   
     Bentley               NA       NA          1,780     97.6   
     Lamborghini           NA       NA            403     63.2   
    SAIC                 327,091   13.2     4,008,967  
   12.0   
     Shanghai VW         104,928   12.3     1,165,827     16.4   
     Shanghai GM          80,529  -10.1     1,231,539     18.5   
     Own brand cars       16,888   20.2       162,004      1.0   
     SAIC-GM-Wuling      114,570   36.0     1,301,118      5.4   
   *Ford Motor            49,238    10        519,390      7.0   
      CFM (Ford brands)   30,788    4.0       320,658      5.0   
      Jiangling           17,509   17.0       194,588      9.0   
    Great Wall Motor       NA      NA         494,800     22.5  
     Export                NA      NA          85,000     50.0   
    Honda Motor           78,319   35.8       617,764     -4.5   
     Guangqi Honda        51,522   35.3       362,294     -6.1   
     Dongfeng Honda       26,797   36.7       255,470     -2.0   
    Mazda Motor           23,456  -33.0       214,799    -10.0   
   *Toyota Motor           NA      NA         883,000     -4.4   
   *General Motors       196,797    9.8     2,547,171      8.3   
     Shanghai GM          77,699   10.8     1,200,355     16.2   
      Buick                                   645,537     17.4   
      Chevrolet                               595,068      9.4   
          Cruze                               221,196       NA   
          Sail                                166,693       NA   
      Cadillac                                 30,008     72.8   
     SAIC-GM-Wuling      113,491   35.7     1,285,820      4.8   
             
      Wuling                                1,193,708      3.9   
       Sunshing minivan                       572.980       NA   
       Baojun                                  21,854       NA  
     FAW-GM                5,268    NA         56,132       NA   
   *BYD                   52,009    1.4       448,484    -13.7   
    BAIC Group             NA       NA      1,526,300  
    2.4   
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     
* Ford's China car sales, including CFMA, excluded Mazda's sales in 2011.  
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    * Toyota's 4.4 percent sales decline in 2010 is calculated based on its 2010 figure.  
    * Sales of GM's Sunshine van, which accounts for 48 percent of SGMW's sales, were 
calculated based on GM data. Baojun was launched in August of 2011. Shanghai GM and 
SGMW's sales include domestic sales only.  
    * BYD's sales include domestic passenger car sales only.  
    * VW's sales including models sold in Mainland China and Hong Kong. Year-on-year 
growth rate of Skoda, Bentley and Lamborghini are calculated based on 2010 figures. 
Imported Audi sales are for Mainland China only.  
    * BMW sales include BMW and Mini only.  
    * Dongfeng's sales include the Hong Kong listed company only, which holds most of 
its state parents auto assets.   
    * BAIC, FAW and Changan's data are provided by CAAM.  
     NOTE: General Motors Co operates a 49-51 car-manufacturing venture with top 
Chinese automaker SAIC Motor Corp in Shanghai. It also makes mini-vans and pick-up 
trucks in a three-way tie-up with SAIC and Liuzhou Wuling Automobile in southern 
China. It has another venture with FAW Group, making light commercial vehicles.   
    Toyota Motor Corp operates car ventures with Guangzhou Automobile Group Co Ltd 
and FAW Group in China.   
    Hyundai Motor Co has a car venture with BAIC Group. Kia Motors Corp makes cars 
in China in a tie-up with Dongfeng Motor Group, Jiangsu Yueda Investment Co Ltd.   
    Ford Motor makes Fiesta, Focus, Mondeo and other sedans in China in a three-way tie-
up with Chongqing Changan Automobile Co Ltd and Japan's Mazda Motor Corp. It also 
holds 30 percent of Jiangling Motors Corp, which makes Ford's Transit vans.   
    Volkswagon makes cars in partnership with SAIC and FAW.   
    Honda Motor makes cars in tie-ups with Dongfeng Motor Group and Guangzhou 
Automobile Group Co.   
    Dongfeng Motor also makes vehicles in tie-ups with Honda Motor, Nissan Motor Co 
Ltd and PSA Peugeot-Citroen. The Dongfeng Nissan venture makes both cars and light 
commercial vehicles.  
    Daimler AG makes Mercedes-Benz models in China in partnership with Beijing 
Automotive Industry Holding Corp.  
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    SAIC operates car ventures with GM and Volkswagen AG. It also makes mini-vehicles 
in southern China with GM and subsidiary Liuzhou Wuling Automobile.   
    BYD Co Ltd is 10 percent owned by U.S. billionaire investor Warren Buffett's 
Berkshire Hathaway.   
    Great Wall Motor Company is China's largest SUV maker.   
    Geely Automobile Holdings Ltd is a private-sector carmaker. Its parent Zhejiang Geely 
in August took over Ford Motor's Volvo car unit, marking the biggest acquisition in 
Chinese auto industry.   
    BMW AG makes cars in partnership with parent of Brilliance China Automotive 
Holdings Ltd. 
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APPENDIX G 
Current and Future Trends in the Automotive Industry 
The effects of the global economy were on the agenda at the annual Original 
Equipment Suppliers Association (OESA) meeting 
by Sasha Banks, November 2010 
At the annual meeting of the Original Equipment Suppliers Association (OESA) 
on November 8 in Detroit, Michigan, executives from leading automotive original 
equipment manufacturers and suppliers provided an economic and operational analysis of 
the global automotive industry. Here are some highlights.  
How the Recession is Affecting Automakers 
Overall, panelists expressed strong confidence in the economic recovery, although 
all agreed the turnaround is slow. Key future strategies for the automotive industry were 
to boost productivity and competitiveness (especially in Southern Europe), rein in 
healthcare and pensions costs, clean up the housing wreckage, and help the chronically 
unemployed. 
In the United States, intensifying pressures for the domestic automotive industry 
are affecting the price of raw materials — up almost 50 percent — and the declining U.S. 
dollar. While U.S. exports have become very appealing, other countries are waging a 
currency war to prevent their currencies from dropping. Another factor affecting domestic 
automakers is the growing demand for high-tech equipment –boosting growth in 
production and exports by 10 to 30 percent. The rates of interest, currency, growth (less 
than 2 percent) and inflation, which remain low, are inhibiting a more accelerated 
recovery. Exacerbating this slow growth is deleveraging, where consumers increase 
 132
personal savings and reduce their debt; a 9 percent unemployment rate; and uncertainty 
over the future of government policies such as the Bush administration’s tax cuts and the 
Obama administration’s healthcare bill. 
In Europe, the global recession continues to thwart economic recovery as it is 
plagued by high unemployment, weak wage gains, and a tight credit market. These 
factors put tremendous restraint on consumer spending and business investment—the 
latter of which is limited by substantial excess capacity and concerns about the strength 
and sustainability of recovery. Yet while Germany has benefitted from exports to China, 
Italy and Spain continue to struggle, and Greece has become virtually insolvent. In fact, 
according to the panelists, all holders of Greek bonds will have to take a 30 percent 
“haircut” on their investments. 
Among emerging economies, the economic condition includes low debt, strong 
growth of six to eight percent, rising threats of inflation, interest and pressure on 
exchange rates, and increasing risks of an overheated asset bubble. China has an 
accumulated US$2.2 trillion in reserves, speculated to mask its hidden debt, and the 
Asia/Pacific region is counting on exports to strengthen its domestic economy. Consumer 
spending accounts for only 35 percent of China’s economy versus India’s, whose 
consumer spending accounts for over 60 percent. While India’s economy is behind China, 
be prepared for the surge. In Latin America, debt levels are low and sustained growth 
levels are estimated to be between five to six percent.  
The Future of the Automotive Industry 
Analysts predict a V-shaped growth pattern for the automotive sector globally. 
Yet, despite market-imposed capacity constraints, anticipated production is expected to 
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increase from 11 million units in 2010 to 15.5 million units by 2011. While the U.S. 
vehicle sales forecast is encouraging, healthcare and pension costs threaten margins for 
U.S. automakers. This year, the U.S. vehicle sales recovery has been driven by fleet sales 
— sales of a large number of vehicles to companies such as rental car agencies and 
commercial truck operators. This demand is defined by the miles driven per year, the 
average age of the fleet (9 years), population growth rates, and the age of drivers. 
Slowing the demand for new vehicles domestically is the growing rate of the retired 
population, who will drive their vehicles 40 percent less and make fewer new vehicle 
purchases.  
As automakers gear for the next-generation industry transformation, panelists 
cited a number of factors that will be affecting the resurgence of original equipment 
manufacturers and suppliers alike. These include increasingly rigorous legislative 
mandates on emissions, safety and quality; intense pressure to scale, particularly for the 
emerging markets; new or evolving joint-venture business models due to all the recent 
mergers and acquisitions in the industry; and narrowing product portfolios. All of this 
must also be tied to a myopic focus on taking the number-one or number-two market 
positions and delivering best-in-class project margins. 
Speaking about the future of the American automotive industry, Retired Vice 
Chairman of General Motors Company Bob Lutz delivered a riveting, sharp-tongued 
criticism of automakers. Lutz proclaimed that graduates of U.S. Ivy League business 
schools — including himself — have contributed to the demise of economic growth and 
product excellence in the United States. According to Lutz, MBAs don’t understand the 
power of image, style or fashion trends on vehicle sales and the driver experience. 
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Instead, he said, MBA-produced analysis and profit optimization models focus only on 
short-term internal targets, and are not driven by the consumer market. In a plea for 
corrective action, Lutz demanded renewed focus on long-term product, service and 
customer experience excellence. He said General Motors’ management should be less 
concerned with cost and more concerned with whether the vehicle is selling in the 
market. Lutz concluded with a mandate for the industry to correct its numbers-driven 
myopia with a broader perspective and corporate culture based on a long-term vision of 
consumer-driven product excellence.  
Technology and Automobiles 
Meeting speakers emphasized the influence of technological advances in the 
future of automotive companies. High-tech equipment will become more and more 
prevalent — for example, in-vehicle telematics, which provide drivers with instant safety, 
security and communications services. Practical applications include voice assisted 
driving directions, parking, acceleration and vehicle failure detection. Telematics-driven 
infotainment services include Bluetooth wireless and satellite radio. Future applications 
will include vehicle-to-vehicle communications to ensure vehicles keep a safe distance 
from each other to avoid and perhaps eliminate collisions. Automakers will be pressured 
to develop a global platform, upon which vehicles are designed, engineered and 
produced, to leverage the most capital-intensive equipment and resources initially, and 
then customize and accessorize later for regional preferences. Perhaps most critically, car 
manufacturers and suppliers will need to embrace a long-term consumer vision to 
succeed, in the same way in which Apple has done with its iPod, iPhone and iPad 
products. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
Table H-1  Automotive Industry and Economy 
 
 
(in € million) Turnover Investments Public Revenue 
Argentina 3,519   
Australia 18,929  887 
Austria 13,900 580 8,315 
Belgium 18,225 302 7,155 
Brazil 26,997 1,141  
Canada 77469* 2496** 9,701 
China 86,984 5,330  
Croatia 205 20 1 
Czech Rep. 12,091 663 1,032 
Denmark 1,165 46 5,867 
Egypt 2,901 1,661 1,911 
Finland 1,076 36 3,807 
France 111,901 4,196 34,000 
Germany 227,666 11,900 44,314 
Greece 162 17 3,200 
Hungary 8,144 432  
India 16,893 1,014 11,122 
Indonesia 3,858 1,071  
Italy 54,135 3,450 40,954 
Japan 435,610 6,450 66,444 
Korea 62,993 2,239 16,615 
Malaysia 6,084 1,263  
Mexico 3,348   
Netherlands 7,876 81 10,837 
Poland 16,202 893  
Portugal 4,457 176 6,897 
Romania 1,836 308  
Russia 7,019 223 654 
Slovakia 8,711 1,056  
Slovenia 1,544 40  
South Africa 20,602 277 3,459 
Spain 75,104 2,740 23,212 
Sweden 24,784 861 5,590 
Switzerland 4,252  4,689 
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Thailand 11655* 443 2,871 
Turkey 28,196 502 10,127 
UK 58,238 1,590 46,099 
USA 425,106 30,416 64,289 
Total 1,889,840 84,801 433,160 
                    *Gross production value **gross fixed capital formation 
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E M P L O Y M E N T  
Table H-2  Employment 
E M P L O Y M E N T  
Argentina 12,166   Korea 246,900 
Australia 43,000   Malaysia 47,000 
Austria 32,000   Mexico 137,000 
Belgium 45,600   Netherlands 24,500 
Brazil 289,082   Poland 94,000 
Canada 159,000   Portugal 22,800 
China 1,605,000   Romania 59,000 
Croatia 4,861   Russia 755,000 
Czech Rep. 101,500   Serbia 14,454 
Denmark 6,300   Slovakia 57,376 
Egypt 73,200   Slovenia 7,900 
Finland 6,530   South Africa 112,300 
France 304,000   Spain 330,000 
Germany 773,217   Sweden 140,000 
Greece 2,219   Switzerland 15,500 
Hungary 40,800   Thailand 182,300 
India 270,000   Turkey 230,736 
Indonesia 64,000   UK 213,000 
Italy 196,000   USA 954,210 
Japan 725,000     
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Table H-3  2011 Production Statistics 
2 0 1 1  P R O D U C T I O N  S TAT I S T I C S  
 
Country Cars 
Commerc
ial 
vehicles 
Total 
% 
change 
Argentina 577,233 252,925 830,158 15.9% 
Australia 189,503 34,690 224,193 -8.1% 
Austria 130,343 22,162 152,505 45.2% 
Belgium 560,779 34,305 595,084 7.2% 
Brazil 2,534,534 871,616 3,406,150 0.7% 
Canada 990,483 1,144,410 2,134,893 3.2% 
China 
14,485,32
6 
3,933,550 
18,418,87
6 
0.8% 
Czech Rep. 1,191,968 7,866 1,199,834 11.5% 
Egypt 53,072 28,659 81,731 -30.0% 
Finland 2,540 0 2,540 -61.9% 
France 1,931,030 311,898 2,242,928 0.6% 
Germany 5,871,918 439,400 6,311,318 6.9% 
Hungary 211,218 2,313 213,531 1.0% 
India 3,038,332 888,185 3,926,517 10.4% 
Indonesia 561,863 276,085 837,948 19.3% 
Iran 1,413,276 235,229 1,648,505 3.1% 
Italy 485,606 304,742 790,348 -5.7% 
Japan 7,158,525 1,240,129 8,398,654 -12.8% 
Malaysia 488,441 45,254 533,695 -6.0% 
Mexico 1,657,080 1,022,957 2,680,037 14.4% 
Netherland
s 
40,772 N.A. 40,772 -56.7% 
Poland 722,285 108,346 830,631 -4.5% 
Portugal 141,779 50,463 192,242 21.1% 
Romania 310,243 24,989 335,232 -4.5% 
Russia 1,738,163 249,873 1,988,036 41.7% 
Serbia 25,494 740 26,234 45.5% 
Slovakia 639,763 0 639,763 13.9% 
Slovenia 168,955 5,164 174,119 -17.6% 
South 
Africa 
312,265 220,280 532,545 12.8% 
South 
Korea 
4,221,617 435,477 4,657,094 9.0% 
Spain 1,819,453 534,229 2,353,682 -1.4% 
Sweden 188,969 N.A. 188,969 -13.0% 
Taiwan 288,523 54,773 343,296 13.1% 
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Thailand 537,987 919,811 1,457,798 -11.4% 
Turkey 639,734 549,397 1,189,131 8.6% 
Ukraine 97,585 5,492 103,077 24% 
UK 1,343,810 120,189 1,463,999 5.1% 
USA 2,966,133 5,687,427 8,653,560 11.5% 
Uzbekistan 146,300 33,260 179,560 14.5% 
Others 367,138 128,009 495,147 2.0% 
Total 
59,870,83
8 
20,163,82
4 
79,989,15
5 
3.1% 
 
Man-made CO2 Emission 
Globally, road transport is responsible for about 16% of man-made CO2 
emissions.  It is a common misconception that global warming is mainly caused by cars 
and trucks. It is important to understand that there are other, larger, contributors and ALL 
sources of CO2 emission must be addressed if the problem is to be solved. 
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Figure H  Man-made CO2 Emission 
 
